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Preface 
In 2004 research was conducted into financial exclusion in Leeds. The research considered 
two aspects of the issue. Firstly, to undertake research to establish the extent of the problem 
in Leeds for individuals, disadvantaged communities and Leeds as a whole. Secondly, to 
undertake a feasibility study to determine responses that would address the situation and in 
particular consider what role could be played by the expansion of Credit Union facilities or 
other forms of community enterprise in addressing the problems faced by financially 
excluded communities. 
Research was carried out in conjunction with a range of Council departments and partners 
including the Citizens Advice Bureau, Local Authority Welfare Rights teams, elected 
representatives – Councillors, MP‟s, Community Involvement teams and neighbourhood 
community groups – and in liaison with partnership groups such as Leeds Voice and Leeds 
Faith Communities Liaison Forum. A survey was conducted involving interviews with 410 
householders and the results of this survey formed a significant base of data illustrating the 
extent of the problem. 
The study identified the credit market in Leeds which targets disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
and the different communities within them and particularly focused on sub-prime 
moneylenders. The percentage of people with and without bank accounts was identified and 
also those without access to mainstream credit facilities.  Difficulties which people faced in 
obtaining mainstream banking facilities were considered and what factors were associated 
with this difficulty (e.g. Security/identity checks brought about through money laundering 
regulations, lack of access to bank facilities, lack of skills/knowledge/access to 
telephone/internet banking, banking practices, religious or cultural factors.) 
The research also looked into the extent of debt and its impact on individuals, disadvantaged 
communities and the City as a whole and considered the distinction between manageable and 
un-manageable debt in the defined areas.  
The research identified needs which came under three broad headings:  
Affordable credit, debt advice and financial literacy 
The underlying need was for services to be locally provided and integrated. In order to ensure 
a long-term and sustainable commitment, political support was secured from across all the 
Council's main political parties. One of the key factors in developing the successful project 
was the establishment of a broad Steering Group. This Steering Group covers all City 
Council Departments and many partners from the public, private and voluntary sector. The 
group now comprises over 100 representatives from 50 partner organisations. 
Some of the key initiatives developed since that time, include: 
Affordable Credit  
 The roll out of Credit Union branches in the Council's One Stop Centre and housing cash 
offices – expansion from 2 branches in 2005 to 10 by 2008. 
 Expansion of the development of Credit Union schools saving clubs. 
 Launch of an enterprise loan scheme run by the Credit Union to provide finance to small 
businesses who would not normally be able to raise funds for expansion - funded through 
the Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI). 
 The launch of the Leeds “Loan Shark” project in conjunction with Birmingham City 
Council and West Yorkshire Trading Standards. 
 Launch of the Credit Union 'Handiloan' affordable loan scheme. 
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 Discussions with the Post Office about greater collaboration in dealing with Credit Union 
accounts. 
Debt/Money Advice  
 Development of the Leeds Money Advice Project (MAP) partnership which unified all 
the city‟s 5 debt advice providers and resulted in a successful joint bid to the DTI (now 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills - BIS) for additional face-to-face debt 
advice funding. 
 Developing a project to provide basic financial management and debt counselling training 
to staff working in the Council's customer service points and other front-line staff. 
 Offering families advice services via the Council's Children‟s Centres which provide 
integrated childcare and education for early-years children. 
 Development of debt and financial advice packages by Leeds Housing Arms Length 
Management Organisations (ALMO‟s) and housing associations, to assist tenants with 
their debt and money problems. 
 Provided an extensive communications network between all partners involved in debt / 
money advice support to enable easier access to debt counselling appointments for clients. 
Financial literacy  
 Co-development of financial literacy packages for young children by the Council's library 
service and Yorkshire Bank. 
 Development by Education Leeds (the city‟s education administration provider) of 
financial literacy packages for school-age children. 
 Working with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to deliver financial capability 
training for all council staff.  
Cross initiative/strategic  
 Key Improvement Priority in the Leeds Strategic Plan (successor to the Local Area 
Agreement). 
 New approach to developing a Council “Corporate Debt Policy” involving key partners 
who have direct experience in dealing with debt problems. 
 Commissioned this current piece of research to determine the economic and regeneration 
impact of financial inclusion initiatives. 
 Joined with seven other European partner cities developing joint approaches to social 
exclusion issues. Leeds City Council showcasing the financial inclusion project. 
In recognition of Leeds City Council‟s work in this area it was awarded Beacon Status by the 
Government‟s Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) in 2007 in the theme; 
Promoting Financial Inclusion and Tackling Over-Indebtedness. 
The success achieved to-date is a testament to the collaborative arrangements adopted in the 
city. The original financial exclusion research proved to be valuable in providing the 
evidence required to convince government and key stakeholders that financial exclusion 
existed in Leeds, and recommend ways in which it could be best tackled. 
When the 2004 research was concluded the findings were reported to a half day conference 
attended by a significant number of partners working in the Leeds area.  At this conference it 
was determined that a similar exercise should be undertaken five years later. This was to 
attempt to identify if the impact of the financial inclusion strategy (which developed in 
response to research findings) was having the desired and intended effects in the 
neighbourhoods which were subject to the original research. 
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Thus in January 2010, the same survey was conducted with 600 households in the same 
neighbourhoods. In addition, 300 households in less deprived neighbourhoods were surveyed 
focusing on homeowners to provide information about the extent of financial exclusion 
arising from the economic recession in recent years. 
This report compares the results from the 2004 and 2010 surveys. It also contains an 
extensive discussion of the changes in financial inclusion policy and financial exclusion 
nationally for the same period. We hope that it will aid policy-makers and practitioners 
beyond Leeds to understand the changing nature of financial exclusion. 
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Glossary  
ABI   Association of British Insurers 
BBA   British Banker Association 
CDFA   Community Development Finance Association 
CDFI Community Development Financial Institution – independent 
organisation lending and investing in deprived areas and underserved 
markets without access to mainstream finance 
CDVC model  Community Development Venture Capital model 
CERT Carbon Emissions Reduction Target 
CITR Community Investment Tax Relief 
DEFRA  Department of Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs 
DWP   Department of Works and Pension 
DTI   Department of Trade and Industry (now BERR) 
FIF Financial Inclusion Fund 
FIT Financial Inclusion Taskforce 
FRS Family Resources Survey 
Growth Fund Fund of £36 million fund set up by DWP in 2004 to increase 
availability of affordable personal loans via third sector (not-for-profit) 
lenders (e.g. CDFIs and credit unions) 
HCI Home Contents Insurance 
NAO National Audit Office 
NCC National Consumer Council 
NHF National Housing Federation 
OFT Office of Fair Trading 
Phoenix Fund Fund set up by BIS (then DTI) in 2000 to support innovative 
demonstrator projects working in disadvantaged areas. It benefited 62 
CDFIs with £42.5 million in capital and revenue funding 
PAT   Policy Action Team 
POCA   Post Office Card Accounts 
RDAs   Regional Development Agencies 
SOA   Super Output Area 
SEU   Social Exclusion Unit 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
In 2004, a survey of 410 households in deprived neighbourhoods was conducted as part of a 
study of financial exclusion in Leeds (henceforth referred to as Original sample). In 2010, the 
same survey was conducted with 602 households in the same neighbourhoods to see if the 
nature and magnitude of financial exclusion had changed since the last survey was conducted 
(henceforth referred to as Repeat sample). In addition, 300 households in less deprived 
neighbourhoods were surveyed (henceforth referred to as Extended sample). This latter 
sample can be regarded as “average” for the city or is “typical” of the city average in terms of 
level of deprivation. The Extended sample focused on homeowners and intended to provide 
information about the extent of financial exclusion arising from the economic recession in 
recent years.  
Between 2004, when the first survey was conducted, and 2010, when the last survey was 
conducted, the UK has experienced its largest banking crisis since the interwar years and the 
greatest recession since World War II. Thus the results have been discussed in the context of 
the recession as well as the national financial inclusion policies and national trends in 
financial exclusion. 
It is important to stress that a limitation of such a survey methodology is that, particularly 
given the sample size, it is not suitable for ascertaining issues for small minority groups, such 
as the disabled, ethnic minority groups and people with mental health problems. 
Impact of the recession 
The survey results suggest that the households surveyed in the repeat sample had indeed been 
affected by the recession. One in four households across both samples had someone who had 
been made redundant, had their hours reduced or had their pay cut during the previous twelve 
months. There was also a significantly greater proportion of unemployed in the repeat and 
extended sample compared with the original sample. This is likely to affect the extent and 
nature of financial exclusion in the repeat sample, as households on low fixed incomes with 
weak or no links to the labour market are less likely to hold and use most mainstream 
financial products. 
Banking and transaction services 
In Leeds the access to basic banking and transaction services has increased significantly. 
There has been a significant increase in ownership of bank accounts as well as a significant 
fall in the percentage that has been denied a bank account since the original survey. There is 
also evidence suggesting an increased usage of direct debits which is not the case nationally. 
Despite this the use of banking and transactional services largely mirrors the national and 
regional picture. There has been considerable progress in terms of access to bank accounts 
both in England and further in Yorkshire and the Humber. In the latter, the percentage of 
households with current accounts has risen from 85% to 91% between 1999 and 2008. Also 
the proportion of households without any form of account fell from 7% in both England and 
the region in 1999 to 3% in 2008. This is likely to be the result of the introduction of no-frill 
bank accounts as well as the move toward payment of benefits directly into bank accounts. 
Savings and assets 
Nationally and regionally the propensity to save has remained largely stable, falling mainly 
for lower income groups. The repeat Leeds survey saw a significant drop in the propensity to 
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save, the frequency of saving and levels of savings. The proportion of households in Leeds 
without savings has nearly doubled. This is likely to be because the households surveyed in 
Leeds were considerably poorer and more excluded than the national average. 
Affordable credit 
The Government has sought to enable low-income households to access affordable credit 
through supporting the provision of credit through third sector lenders. In Leeds both sub-
prime and mainstream borrowing has decreased since 2004. In terms of affordable credit, 
there was an increase in awareness of the credit union though no significant change in credit 
union membership among survey respondents since 2004. However, the number of Leeds 
Credit Union adult members has increased from just over 10,000 in 2004 to over 21,500 in 
2010. In the same period the total membership (including junior accounts and members under 
the age of 18) rose from 12,000 to in excess of 26,000. 
Insurance 
In Leeds, there has been a significant fall in the likelihood of having home contents insurance. 
Just under a third of respondents (32%) in the Repeat survey said they had contents insurance, 
significantly fewer than was found in 2004 when it stood at 39%. Nationally, the ownership 
of home contents insurance has remained low for tenants and low-income households despite 
falls in the cost of such insurance in real terms. 
Over-indebtedness 
Similar to the national trends, over-indebtedness in Leeds appears to have risen since 2004. 
This is evidenced by the rise in mortgage repossessions. The survey results indicate a 
significant rise in the level of worry of getting into debt. In the 2004 Leeds survey, 40% were 
very or fairly worried compared with 60% in 2010. There is also a significant increase in the 
percentage of households who are behind with one or more bills, though the list of possible 
bills was more extensive in the repeat questionnaire than in 2004.  
Fuel poverty 
Nationally fuel poverty has increased sharply especially since 2006. Today over 4 million 
households in England are classed as fuel poor, of which 3.2 million are classed as vulnerable. 
This is up from 1.2 million households in 2004. In Leeds too fuel poverty seems to be on the 
rise. A significantly higher proportion of survey respondents struggled to pay their fuel bills 
in 2010 than in the original sample. However, a higher proportion of respondents are paying 
their fuel bills using direct debits, which tends to lead to lower fuel bills relative to 
prepayment meter and cash payments. 
Groups and areas affected by financial exclusion 
A comparison of the Original and Repeat Leeds survey respondents suggests that the same 
groups are experiencing financial exclusion. In both the Original and Repeat surveys, social 
housing tenants were far more likely to have fallen behind with bills than owner-occupiers. 
Owner occupiers were more likely to have savings and home contents insurance than other 
tenures. Overwhelmingly, workless and lone parent households were more likely to have no 
savings at all or less than £100. The groups least likely to have a bank account were men 
under 60 living alone and pensioner only households. 
However, an examination of the respondents in the Extended sample suggest that financial 
exclusion not only affects the most deprived neighbourhoods and groups such as lone parents 
and households on means-tested benefits. The respondents of the Extended sample, generally 
more affluent than the Original and Repeat survey samples, were only slightly more likely to 
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save using a bank or building society account than the respondents of the 2004 survey. They 
were also significantly less likely to save, in any form, when compared with the original 
survey. Furthermore, the respondents of the Extended survey were less likely to have 
mainstream borrowing when compared with the Original survey respondents.  
Implications for research and policy 
The findings of this report paint a somewhat bleak picture of financial exclusion in Leeds. 
With the important exception of access to and use of banking and transaction services, 
financial exclusion has grown since the last survey. This is not likely to be a reflection on the 
significant financial inclusion interventions implemented in the UK and in Leeds. Ultimately, 
as with any form of interventions, the impact of financial inclusion interventions can only be 
ascertained through a designated study examining the effects on beneficiaries of a given 
number of interventions and the costs of these interventions. A recent study on the Economic 
Impacts of Financial Inclusion Initiatives found that financial inclusion interventions in Leeds 
had a cumulative impact of £28 million on the regional economy.
1
 Further, the financial and 
economic crisis may also have eroded any gains of financial inclusion interventions.  
However, the findings of this study provide important lessons for financial inclusion 
practitioners. First, the influence of national factors on financial exclusion locally is likely to 
be considerable. Second, the trends in financial exclusion are closely linked to trends in 
employment and other socioeconomic factors. This suggests that combating financial 
exclusion is not likely to be very effective if done in isolation of wider social inclusion 
interventions and labour market interventions. Local authorities and other stakeholders in 
financial inclusion also need to be attuned to the national picture and lobby the national 
government for the implementation of more effective financial inclusion policies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Dayson et al (2009). Economic impact and regeneration in city economies – The case of Leeds. Report 
prepared for Yorkshire Forward and Leeds City Council, October 2009. 
1. Introduction 
The present document presents the findings and the methodology for a research project 
looking at the changes in the extent and nature of financial exclusion in Leeds since 2004, 
when the first survey of financial exclusion was conducted. 
The remainder of this report is organised into 4 chapters: 
- Chapter 2: Literature review 
- Chapter 3: Methodology 
- Chapter 4: Findings 
- Chapter 5: Conclusions and recommendations 
Supplementary documentation can be found in Appendices A-D: 
- Appendix A: Survey methodology and sampling 
- Appendix B: Overview of samples 
- Appendix C: Questionnaire 
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2. Financial inclusion policy and context since 2004: A review of policy and 
research 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews developments in the nature and magnitude of financial exclusion and in 
financial inclusion policy since the last survey was conducted in Leeds in 2004. This will aid 
in the analysis of the survey data. The remainder of the chapter is organised into nine sections. 
The second section examines the economic and political context, focusing especially on the 
current financial and economic crisis, while the third provides an overview of the evolution 
of financial inclusion policy, especially since 2004. The following six sections look at 
changes in access to banking and transaction services (Section 4), savings and assets (5), the 
access to affordable credit (6), affordable insurance (7), over-indebtedness (8) and fuel 
poverty (9). The final section discusses the implications for the survey findings. 
2.2. Economic and political context 
Any account of changes to a population or a social phenomenon over the past few years 
would be incomplete without reference to the current financial and economic crisis and its 
implications. 
The current financial crisis “is the largest [banking crisis] since 1929-33” (Barrell and Davis, 
2008, p.5). The trajectory of the crisis is well-known by now. Falling US house prices, rising 
mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures led to massive losses in sub-prime residential 
mortgages and mortgage backed securities in the spring of 2007. The subsequent loss of 
confidence in financial institutions led to a freeze in inter-bank lending, which contributed to 
the fall of Northern Rock in February 2008. The bottom fell out of the market in September 
2008 with the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers and the near-collapse of the insurance 
giant American Insurance Group (AIG) triggering panic sales and large losses in the stock 
market. 
Up until the onslaught of the financial crisis and the current economic difficulties, the UK 
economy had experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth. However, a perfect 
storm of reduced availability of credit, rising prices for raw materials, energy and other inputs, 
and falling prices for output pushed the UK economy into negative growth rates in 2008.  
Although economic growth resumed in the last quarter of 2009, the consequences of the 
financial crisis are likely to reverberate for some years to come. The National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research (NIESR) predicts that growth will remain low in 2010 and 
2011 hovering around 1% and that unemployment will peak at above 9% in 2011 (Kirby et al, 
2010). 
The full consequences of the economic and financial crisis on the nature and magnitude of 
financial exclusion are not yet known as limited research has been conducted in the field, 
making this study a timely contribution, and the effects are likely to be lagged. It is expected 
that the economic and financial crisis will increase the number of people that are financially 
excluded. A tightening of lending criteria, job losses, rising debt and repossessions are likely 
to increase the number of credit impaired households. This, one would expect, would reduce 
the ownership rates of products linked to credit rating, such as current accounts, mortgages, 
consumer loans, credit cards and insurance policies. In addition it has also been speculated 
that sub-prime lenders have taken advantage of the tightening of lending policies among 
mainstream banks to move upwards in the market. 
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2.3. Financial Inclusion Policy 
Numerous policies and events have affected the financial inclusion policy since it became 
recognised as an important issue within deprived neighbourhoods following the establishment 
by the previous Government of the Policy Action Teams (PATs) in 1998 and since the last 
survey was conducted in Leeds in 2004 (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Financial Inclusion Timeline: Policies and Events 
1998 18 PATs set up by Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) to tackle problems facing people in 
deprived neighbourhoods; PAT 14 focused on personal finance & PAT 3 focused on 
enterprise development 
1999 PATs launch findings 
 Inter-ministerial group on fuel poverty set up 
2000 Social Investment Taskforce recommends creation Community Investment Tax Relief 
(CITR) & Community Development Venture Capital (CDVC), & disclosure of bank 
lending in deprived communities 
 Phoenix Fund launched 
 Fuel Poverty Monitoring and Technical Group set up to monitor progress on 
combating fuel poverty & to provide advice to government on fuel poverty policy 
 Home Energy Efficiency Scheme (now Warm Front Team) launched to provide 
insulation & heating measures to private sector housing households on certain benefits 
2001 Association of British Insurers (ABI) & Housing Corporation launched best practice 
guidance on establishing insurance with rent schemes 
 UK Fuel Poverty Strategy released 
2002 Introduction of CITR business lending to Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs) 
 1
st
 Savings Gateway Pilot Launched 
 Bridges Ventures launched 
 Community Development Finance Association (CDFA) founded 
2003 Consumer Credit White Paper “Fair, clear and competitive. The Consumer Credit 
Market in the 21
st
 Century” 
 Social security benefits & state retirement pension paid into accounts rather than 
girocheques & payment books 
 Basic Bank Account – a no-frills bank a/c not requiring credit scoring – introduced  
 Post Office Card Account (POCA) – electronic version of girocheque or payment 
book – launched 
2004 AND BEYOND… 
2004 Illegal Money Lending Team piloted in Glasgow & Birmingham 
 Policis report “The effect of interest rate controls in other countries” argues that 
interest rate ceilings may force people to take out larger loans, increase illegal money 
lending & entice lenders to introduce/increase other charges 
 National Consumer Council (NCC) lodges super-complaint against home credit 
industry with Office of Fair Trading (OFT). OFT response points to lack of 
competition 
 Government & major banks agree on shared goal of halving number of adults living in 
households without access to a bank account 
 Treasury Committee announces inquiry into cash machine charges 
 Government Plan for Action on fuel poverty launched with the aim of ending fuel 
poverty for vulnerable households by 2010 
2005 Child Trust Fund launched 
 2
nd
 Savings Gateway Pilot launched 
 Financial Inclusion Taskforce launched 
 Financial Inclusion Fund 1 (FIF) (£120 million, 2005-08) launched 
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 Treasury Committee publishes report on inquiry into cash machine charges concluding 
though fee-charging machines are legitimate, their spread, if at expense of free 
machines is a concern & called for more transparency on behalf of LINK 
2006 Insurance Working Group established under Financial Inclusion Taskforce (FIT) 
 My Home launched by the National Housing Federation 
 Competition Commission Home Credit Investigation report launched 
 ATM Working Group under chairmanship of John McFall MP reports 
2007 End of Phoenix Fund, responsibility transferred to Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) 
 Roll-out of Illegal Money Lending Teams to all regions in Great Britain 
 Government strategy “Financial inclusion: the way forward” launched 
 Experian publishes “Mapping the demand for, and supply of, third sector affordable 
credit” 
2008 Thoresen review publishes its report recommending a multi-channel approach to the 
delivery of generic money advice, building on a partnership model & a new brand 
reflecting the principles of this new service 
 FIF2 (£135 million, 2008-11) launched 
2009 Homeowners Mortgage Support scheme announced to assist homeowners 
experiencing temporary drops in income by deferring repayments of up to 2 yrs 
 Mortgage Rescue Scheme announced to prevent vulnerable households losing their 
homes via RSL provision of equity loan or government mortgage to rent 
 Moneymadeclear Pilot for North West & North East England to provide people with 
money guidance (online, phone & face-to-face) to make the most of their money in 
response to Thoresen review 
2010 Launch National Audit Office (NAO) report praising FIF2 face-to-face debt advice 
programme but criticising indebtedness strategy  
 Moneymadeclear F2F delivery is due to be rolled out nationally 
 Government announces policy to legally oblige UK banks to open basic bank accounts 
for citizens 
The previous Government put in place a series of financial inclusion interventions since the 
last Leeds survey was conducted in 2004. In the main these interventions have sought to deal 
with market failures in the provision of mainstream financial services by supporting supply 
through the third sector rather than putting in place legislation obliging mainstream service 
providers to provide for the financially excluded. For example, the UK is one of the few 
countries in Western Europe without a cap on interest rates and there are no laws requiring 
disclosure of data on lending to low-income households and areas. Instead, UK legislation is 
predominantly focused on enforcing sales and advertising standards, including ensuring that 
financial product contracts are transparent (displaying APR etc) and banning certain sales 
practices which are seen as predatory, such as cold calls. 
2.4. Banking and transaction services 
The access to transaction and banking services has been at the centre of financial inclusion 
strategy in the UK since financial exclusion became a policy concern in the late 1990s. The 
emphasis on banking and transaction services in terms of policy and targets stems from the 
notion that managing a household budget without these services is very difficult and costly. 
It is also an area where considerable progress has been made. Table 2.2 shows account 
ownership for households in Yorkshire and the Humber, and England, and non-ownership of 
bank accounts in England by weekly income since 1998. 
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Table 2.2: Bank account ownership for households in Yorkshire and the Humber (%) 
 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 
Current 
account 
85 
(86) 
85 
(86) 
82 
(87) 
84 
(88) 
85 
(88) 
87 
(90) 
89 
(91) 
89 
(91) 
88 
(90) 
91 
(92) 
90 
(92) 
Post Office A/C 6 
(12) 
8 
(8) 
8 
(8) 
6 
(7) 
7 
(7) 
6 
(7) 
4 
(5) 
4 
(4) 
4 
(5) 
4 
(4) 
-- 
-- 
POCA -- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
9 
(7) 
9 
(6) 
7 
(7) 
7 
(6) 
Other accounts 60 
(66) 
59 
(62) 
58 
(60) 
56 
(58) 
56 
(56) 
51 
(55) 
51 
(54) 
52 
(51) 
47 
(50) 
46 
(51) 
43 
(50) 
Basic Bank A/C -- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3 
(3) 
8 
(6) 
6 
(5) 
9 
(7) 
8 
(7) 
7 
(6) 
No accounts 7 
(7) 
8 
(8) 
10 
(7) 
9 
(7) 
9 
(7) 
7 
(6) 
5 
(4) 
4 
(3) 
4 
(3) 
3 
(3) 
4 
(3) 
Source: Family Resources Survey, DWP 
Notes: Proportion of bank account ownership for households in England in brackets 
Households in the UK with no bank account by weekly income (%) 
 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 
< £100 16 18 16 16 17 15 10 10 11 7 10 
£100-£199 19 21 21 18 19 16 10 6 6 6 6 
£200-£299 10 12 13 11 12 10 6 4 4 4 3 
£300-£399 3 4 6 5 6 5 4 3 3 3 3 
£400-£499 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
£500-£599 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 
£600-£699 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
£700-£799 -* -* 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 2 
£800-£899   - 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 
£900-£999   1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 
≥ £1,000   1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 
Notes: * Includes all households with incomes of £700 and above 
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The data shows a gradual reduction in the proportion of unbanked households. In Yorkshire 
and the Humber the proportion of households without any type of account was around 9-10% 
between 2000 and 2003. From 2003 to 2009 this percentage fell from 7% to 3%. In England, 
from 1998 to 2003 around 7% had no account. In 2003 onwards this percentage started 
falling until it settled on its current level of 3%. 
If we look at the proportion of UK households with no bank accounts, we can see that 
account ownership increases with weekly income. At the beginning of the period, between 
10% and 19% of households in the three lowest income brackets did not have a bank account, 
compared with 1% for the three highest income brackets. 
However, a more interesting observation is that bank account ownership for higher income 
groups seems to have reached a saturation point at around 1-2% and changes little between 
1998 and 2009. In contrast, the proportion of households in the three lowest income brackets 
without a bank account falls considerably, especially after 2004. 
Absolute figures of unbanked households largely corroborate the increase in bank account 
ownership. Table 2.3 displays the progress made towards the goal agreed between the 
Government and major retail banks in 2004 to halve the number of unbanked households.  
Table 2.3: Progress towards shared goals on unbanked (denoted in millions) 
FRS Year Unbanked households Adults in unbanked households 
2002-03 1.84 2.83 
2005-06 1.30 1.97 
% change since 02/03 - 29% - 30% 
2006-07 1.37 2.09 
% change since 05/06 5% 6% 
2007-08 1.25 1.85 
% change since 06/07  - 8% - 11% 
% change since 02/03 - 32% - 35% 
Source: HM Treasury Statistical Briefings on households without access to bank accounts 
Notes: FRS = Family Resources Survey 
Since 2002-03, the number of unbanked households has fallen by 32%, while the number of 
adults in unbanked households has fallen by 35%. In absolute terms, the number of unbanked 
households fell from 1.84 to 1.3 million from 2002-03 to 2005-06, constituting a percentage 
decrease of nearly 30%. Since then progress has stalled, with the number of unbanked 
households being reduced by a mere 50,000 since 2005-06 or around 4%. 
Further, a survey conducted for the National Consumer Council (NCC) (2005) found that 
low-income consumers were increasingly comfortable with the idea of having their benefits 
paid into a bank account. From 2000 to 2005, the proportion of these households feeling very 
or fairly uncomfortable fell from half to around one in ten. 
This progress is likely to be the product of numerous factors including: 
- Introduction of no-frills accounts: On the back of PAT 14‟s recommendation, the Basic 
Bank Account – a no-frills bank account not requiring credit scoring – was introduced in 
2003. In the same year the Post Office Card Account (POCA) – an electronic version of 
the girocheque or payment book – was also launched. Although questions have been 
raised about their usefulness, they have contributed to reducing the number and 
proportion of unbanked households. Since being launched, 4 million POCAs (Collard, 
2007) and nearly 8 million Basic Bank Accounts (BBA website) have been opened. 
Research commissioned by the British Bankers Association (BBA) suggests that 6 out of 
10 had no other account when opening a basic bank account and 5 out of 10 came from 
households with no bank accounts (Millward Brown Research, 2006). 
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- Electronic payment of benefits: The Government decided to pay benefits and state 
pensions into accounts rather than through payment books and girocheques from 2003, as 
well as housing benefits by 2005. This has also undoubtedly been a contributing factor to 
reducing the number of unbanked households, especially given that households on means-
tested benefits have a high likelihood of being financially excluded or unbanked. 
- Introduction of shared aims: The development and monitoring of a shared goal for 
halving the number of unbanked households and adults has probably also given 
momentum to this trend. 
In its 2010 budget the Government also announced that banks would be legally obliged to 
provide a basic bank account to every citizen. It is expected that this measure may further 
underpin progress towards reducing the number of unbanked households. 
However, there are question marks about the extent to which increased bank account 
ownership in fact leads to increased usage. Research commissioned by Ofgem suggests that 
customers on prepayment meters are unlikely to switch to paying via direct debit (FDS 
International, 2008). Similarly, a National Consumer Council (2005) study found that half of 
basic bank account holders only used their accounts to receive and withdraw benefits, 
preferring to manage their money and pay bills in cash. A study conducted for the Financial 
Inclusion Taskforce also found that the use of prepayment meters and cash payments was 
prevalent among lower income groups (BMRB Social Research, 2006). Finally, research 
conducted for the BBA into basic bank account holders found that 50% did not have any 
direct debits coming out of their bank accounts (Millward Brown Research, 2006). It must be 
noted that it is difficult to track changes in bank account usage as FRS and similar surveys do 
not collect such information. 
This persistence of cash-based budgeting and money management is a major obstacle to 
promoting financial inclusion. By not using electronic means of payment, the households are 
not building up a credit score which potentially could enable them to access mainstream 
financial products. Moreover, paying bills in cash also means higher costs, as the best deals 
tend to be found online. 
One of the main reasons for the persistence of cash-based budgeting is the ability to monitor 
and control spending, and particularly to avoid getting into debt (NCC, 2005; BMRB Social 
Research, 2006). By operating in cash, funds can be allocated to different budget posts 
through the use of designated jars or envelopes enabling the individual responsible for 
budgeting to control spending. 
Another key area of policy on banking and transaction services relates to the access to free 
ATMs. The focus on ATMs can be traced back to the Treasury Select Committee inquiry into 
cash machine charges set up in December 2004. The report published the subsequent year 
raised concerns that if the spread of fee-charging ATMs was happening at the expense of free 
ATMs this could potentially exacerbate financial exclusion. On the back of these concerns, 
an ATM Working Group under the chairmanship of John McFall MP was set up in December 
2006.  
The ATM Working Group (2006) found that there had been a net increase in free ATMs. 
Although there had been an increase in the number and proportion of charging ATMs, the 
proportion of total withdrawals from such machines had remained stable. Statistics from the 
LINK website confirm that this is still the case, as around 97% of cash withdrawals (per 
December 2009) are from free machines, up slightly from the 96% reported by the working 
group. Similarly, research conducted for the Financial Inclusion Taskforce of ATM usage 
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found no evidence suggesting that low-income households disproportionally use charging 
ATMs (BMRB Social Research, 2006). 
However, the group did find that around 1,700 of the most deprived quartile of Super Output 
Areas (SOAs) did not have a free ATM in the area or within 1 kilometre from the centre of 
the area. Around 4% of the UK population live in these SOAs. Half of these areas had 
charging ATMs and a third had a post office branch, an important source for free cash 
withdrawals for low-income households.  
Around 130 of these areas were deemed unsuitable locations for free ATMs due to planning 
issues or low population densities. The Working Group agreed to work towards placing free 
ATMs in the remaining areas. Table 2.4 displays the progress towards that target. 
Table 2.4: Progress on targets for free ATMs in deprived areas 
Target Super Output Areas Number of target areas addressed 
ATM live 979 
ATM under contract* 103 
Total 1,082 
Areas deemed unsuitable 130 
Total resolved or unsuitable 1,212 
Outstanding areas 495 
Total 1,707 
Source: LINK website, updated November 2009 
Notes: * Not all these sites may be installed 
To date around 500 of the areas identified have yet to have a free ATM placed in them. 
2.5. Savings and assets 
Encouraging households and individuals to save in the form of pension policies, regular 
savings accounts and stocks, has been a key concern for the UK government. Households and 
individuals who save may be in better position to cope with income shocks, life-cycle events 
(e.g. old age and retirement) and expenditure hikes without relying on the public safety nets. 
One of the key interventions to promote savings planned by the previous government was the 
Savings Gateway, a matched savings scheme, whereby the government matches funds saved 
through the scheme for households with an income up to a certain level. Since the Original 
survey in 2004, this scheme has been piloted a second time (in 2005) and it was due to be 
rolled out nationally July 2010. However, it has now been cancelled by the new Coalition 
government. 
An evaluation of the second pilot found that there was an increase in the reported savings 
among the households participating in the scheme compared to those who did not participate, 
but that there was no evidence suggesting a positive impact on the net savings of households, 
suggesting a displacement effect (Harvey et al, 2007).  
Another approach to increase the prevalence of savings, particularly, though not exclusively, 
aimed at low-income households has been the establishment of the Child Trust Fund in April 
2005. Under this initiative, all children born on or after September 1
st
 2002 are given £250 to 
start a savings and investment account which cannot be touched until the child turns 18. Since 
then, the new Coalition government has announced that it will be phasing out this fund 
between August 2010 and January 2011. 
Parents have one year to open an account, but many parents have failed to do so. After the 
one year deadline, the government steps in and opens an account with one of eleven providers 
of Child Trust Fund accounts. A concern is that many of these default accounts are not 
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managed actively, or charge the maximum fee of 1.5% a year. So parents would usually get a 
better deal for their child if they looked into shopping around for the best account. Research 
has found that larger families, single parents and low-income households were less likely to 
use the voucher before its expiry date (Bennett et al, 2008). 
Despite these initiatives, the propensity to save has remained largely stable over the past 
decade. Chart 2.1 displays the amount of savings for households in Great Britain, while Chart 
2.2 shows the proportion of households with no savings by income group. (Table 2.5 displays 
the same figures.) 
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Table 2.5: Amounts of savings for households in Great Britain (%) 
 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 
No savings 28 27 28 28 28 27 27 28 24 27 28 
< £1,500 22 23 23 21 20 19 22 21 24 20 18 
£1,500-£3,000 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 
£3,000-£8,000 14 14 14 14 15 16 15 15 14 15 15 
£8,000-£10,000 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 
£10,000-£16,000 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
£16,000-£20,000 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
≥ £20,000 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 16 17 17 19 
Households with no savings by weekly income (%) 
 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 
< £100 45 40 43 43 45 43 44 46 43 41 42 
£100-£199 40 45 47 46 46 45 44 45 36 44 44 
£200-£299 38 38 40 40 40 39 39 41 33 41 41 
£300-£399 27 27 29 31 31 31 32 34 29 34 37 
£400-£499 20 20 20 24 24 27 29 29 28 30 30 
£500-£599 16 16 18 19 21 21 23 25 23 24 27 
£600-£699 12 12 15 16 15 19 20 18 21 21 23 
£700-£799 7* 7* 12 15 16 14 15 14 18 18 19 
£800-£899   11 14 13 14 13 17 16 16 18 
£900-£999   7 10 11 10 16 14 15 14 14 
≥ £1,000   7 9 8 8 9 9 9 9 10 
Notes: * Includes all households with incomes of £700 and above 
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The data suggests a remarkable stability in savings patterns in the last decade. Except for 
2006-2007, around 28% of households have no savings whatsoever. The percentage of 
households with no savings – 27% – was identical for 2003-04 and 2007-08 and only 
increased slightly to 28% in 2008-2009. 
The data on savings by weekly income is less clear. For the lowest income group the 
proportion of households with no savings has fallen from 45 to 41% since 1998-99 and from 
43 to 41% since 2003-04. However, there is considerable variation from year to year for this 
group, in part because of a small and decreasing sample of households from this income 
group. For all other income brackets the likelihood of having no savings has increased. 
Not surprisingly, the likelihood of having no savings increases as weekly income falls. 
Around 40-45% of households in the lowest three income brackets (all below the poverty line) 
have no savings, compared with around 9-16% for the highest three income brackets. 
The data in Table 2.5 is likely to underestimate the extent to which people save as many save 
through informal means (Kempson and Finney, 2009), such as jars, overpayment of 
prepayment meters and Christmas hamper schemes. Nevertheless, there is a persistent and 
low propensity to save, especially among the lower-income groups. Moreover, in their review 
of the existing evidence and literature on saving, Kempson and Finney (2009) conclude that 
low-income households are especially unlikely to save for the medium and long-term. 
The main causes for the low levels of saving include: 
- Life-stage factors: The life-stage in which the household finds itself in is a powerful 
influence on the propensity to save. In particular, research suggests that youth, raising a 
family and retirement are periods characterised by low levels of savings (Kempson and 
Finney, 2009). This is because of low incomes (retired people and to some extent for 
households with children), fluctuating and unpredictable incomes and expenditure 
patterns (households with children) and attitudes (young people). 
- Change in circumstances: People experiencing a change in their circumstances, such as 
ill health, relationship breakdown, purchase of a home and loss or change of job, are less 
likely to save.  
- Financial instability: Fluid and unpredictable incomes and expenditure patterns, often 
due to tenuous links to the labour market and raising a family, make it more difficult to 
save regularly. Households whose lives are characterised by such financial instability are 
less likely to save formally (Kempson and Finney, 2009).  
- Affordability: Households living on low disposable incomes are unsurprisingly less likely 
to save. These households live on a low income because they are unemployed or unable 
to work due to long-term sickness or disability. They may also have low disposable 
income due to heavy credit commitments or because they are remitting income abroad 
(Kempson and Finney, 2009). 
The striking aspect of the list of causes of low propensity to save and low levels of savings is 
that they are all linked to structural factors or barriers. By structural we mean socioeconomic 
and demographic characteristics of household and individuals which are either non-
changeable (e.g. age etc) or which have proven very difficult to alter (e.g. links to labour 
market etc). 
2.6. Affordable credit and sub-prime lending 
Another area in which the Government has invested considerable resources since 2004 has 
been in the provision of affordable credit. Unable to access loans from the mainstream 
banking sector, many households have to resort to high-cost credit provided by the so-called 
sub-prime sector. 
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The sub-prime sector is diverse, comprising home credit companies, licensed financial 
companies, sell-and-buy-back stores, pawnbrokers and instalment credit stores. The sector 
offers a wide and expanding range of financial products, including credit cards, unsecured 
personal loans and mortgages and pre-pay cards. The sub-prime sector principally caters for 
credit-impaired and higher risk borrowers who fail to qualify for loans or other products with 
mainstream financial institutions. The sector offsets this greater risk by charging higher 
interest rates and fees relative to the mainstream sector. 
There are various estimates of the size of the sector. Ellis et al (2006) estimate that there are 
around 2.3 million users of high-cost licensed home credit lenders in the UK, equivalent to 
around 6% of the adult population. A review of the high cost credit sector by the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) found that in 2008 the sector made loans to customers totalling £7.5 
billion (OFT, 2010). 
A recent study of payday lending
2
 estimated that around 1.2 million adults in the UK took out 
payday loans in 2009 (Burton, 2010). The total lending of the payday loan sector was £1.2 
billion and the industry‟s gross income was around £242 million in the same year (Burton, 
2010). In their study of UK pawnbrokers, Collard and Hayes (2010) estimated that the 
number of outlets had increased from 800 in 2003 to around 1,300 today, though much of this 
expansion has been fuelled by non-pawnbroking products, such as cheque cashing and 
payday loans. The sector has a loan book of around £192 million (Collard and Hayes, 2010).  
So far, and unlike the US and many countries in the EU, the Government has chosen not to 
tackle this issue through legislation. On the contrary, the UK has among the most liberal 
regulatory frameworks for financial services in the world (Marshall, 2004), especially among 
developed nations (Reifner, 2007). The UK is one of the few countries in Western Europe 
without a cap on interest rates and there are no laws requiring disclosure of data on lending to 
low-income households and areas. 
Despite campaigning from CDFA and other organisations for a UK Community 
Reinvestment Act
3
 to force banks to disclose lending and invest in the UK community 
finance sector, both New Labour and the Conservatives are unlikely to support such 
legislation. This is because it is not seen as appropriate as the banking sector is not as 
regional or local as in the US and UK governments have generally been averse to 
interventionist policies vis-à-vis the financial sector. 
The UK Government has seen the lack of competition in provision of credit to low-income, 
financially excluded consumers as the key obstacle to accessing affordable credit, rather than 
redlining or discrimination on behalf of banks (HM Treasury, 2004). Since the last survey 
was conducted, competition in the home-credit sector may have decreased further as three 
large providers have withdrawn from the market (London Scottish Bank, the Park Group and 
Cattles). Interestingly the APR for a typical loan from Provident, the market leader, increased 
from 177% to 292.2% in the same period. 
The Government has sought to bridge this gap through increasing the supply of affordable 
credit through the third sector thereby increasing competition. Since 2005, the Government 
has funded such provision through the Growth Fund which consisted of £42 million for the 
                                                 
2
 Payday loans are offered to people in employment. The lender accepts a post dated cheque for an amount 
(typically in the region of £100-125) from which an advance is made less than the full amount. APR varies from 
around 900% to in excess of 3000% on a £125 loan 
3
 The US CRA involves an obligation for banks to meet the needs of low and moderate income borrowers and 
neighbourhoods. Specifically, the act involves disclosure of lending and investment behaviour of financial 
institutions, rating system of behaviour and sanctions against non-compliant institutions. 
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period 2005-2007 and £38 million for 2008-2011. Between July 2006 and February 2010 this 
has enabled third sector lenders to make nearly 207,000 loans to a value of £89 million in 
England (DWP website). 
In 2007 research was conducted for the Financial Inclusion Taskforce looking at gaps in 
provision in areas with great demand (Experian, 2007). Of the 408 Local Authority areas in 
England, Wales and Scotland the research has identified 25 “red alert” areas in the highest 
need of new affordable credit provision, and 56 “amber” areas, which are next in the priority 
order. Part of the Growth Fund has been targeted at these areas. The Growth Fund is currently 
under evaluation and support for credit unions and CDFIs beyond 2011 is uncertain.  
Some work has also been conducted in trying to reach poorer clients. Because typically 
Growth Fund lenders rely on electronic transfers or payment of cash at branch offices, it may 
not cater to all customers of the home credit providers, a key target group for the third sector 
lenders. In light of this, Kempson et al (2009) examined the potential of not-for-profit 
doorstep lending. Though in principle feasible to set up a stand-alone not-for-profit home 
credit provider, it would offer relatively small savings for customers compared with existing 
providers and would arguably run counter to trying to graduate clients to the mainstream 
sector. 
2.7. Insurance 
Whilst the access to insurance received considerable attention in the report of PAT 14, 
insurance itself has been largely neglected until recently. In 2006 a working group on 
insurance under the Financial Inclusion Taskforce was established to work specifically on 
obstacles to broadening the access to affordable insurance products among low-income 
households.  
The main focus of policy on insurance has been on increasing access to home contents cover 
for households and individuals living in rented accommodation by working with social 
landlords to extend the outreach of insurance-with-rent schemes, the availability to which has 
been patchy (HM Treasury, 2007) and the uptake of which has been limited (Hood et al, 
2005). 
In 2006, the National Housing Federation and the social housing insurance broker Jardine 
Lloyd Thompson launched My Home, an affordable, home contents insurance product, 
offered through social housing landlords. Per the second quarter of 2009, My Home was 
offered through 280 social housing landlords and it had around 16,000 tenant policy-holders 
(NHF, Undated). 
The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has identified motivating staff and fitting the 
marketing and selling of insurance alongside their existing tasks as something that needs to 
be tackled. With this in mind, ABI is currently working with the DWP to develop a training 
toolkit for housing staff through the Financial Inclusion Champions scheme. 
Yet despite the renewed emphasis on extending the coverage of Home Contents Insurance 
(HCI), historical data suggests that the ownership of HCI has remained fairly stable over the 
last 15 years. The ABI (2007) reports that despite the fall in costs in real terms of around 40% 
from 1994 to 2007, the proportion of the population with home contents and building 
insurance has remained relatively stable. 
In particular, ownership of HCI has remained low among social housing tenants. Between 
1994/1995 and 2003/2004 the proportion of registered social landlord tenants without HCI 
fell from 63.4% to 59.2%, but the proportion of council tenants increased from 54.4% to 
60.8% (Demos and Safe, 2005). Data from the most recent Family Resources Survey 
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suggests that the proportion of social tenants without insurance has remained stable at around 
64%. 
There is a wide range of factors accounting for the low ownership of both life and HCI 
policies among households living on low incomes and in rented accommodation. On the 
demand side, there are three main factors reducing the propensity of households to take out 
insurance policies. 
First, like other financial products, insurance policies are often not appropriately designed to 
accommodate the needs and preference of low-income consumers. Premiums are often too 
high and there is often no allowance for lapses.  
Second, the channels through which insurance is sold and distributed are likely to discourage 
low-income consumers from purchasing insurance policies. Insurance is often sold online or 
telephonically and serviced using direct debits. Yet, research indicates that these households 
often prefer a more personalised, face-to-face delivery and servicing of financial products 
(Collard et al, 2001; IPSOS Mori, 2007). 
Finally, a low degree of financial literacy and understanding of insurance products may make 
low-income households less likely to solicit such products (Collard et al, 2001). In particular, 
the Insurance Working Group (IWG), established by the Financial Inclusion Taskforce, 
highlights the lack of understanding of the benefits of insurance and mistrust of insurance 
companies as important demand-side barriers to accessing insurance for low-income 
households (IWG cf. HM Treasury, 2007).  
On the supply-side, the high risks involved in delivering insurance to low-income households 
have worked as a barrier for the insurance industry in delivering insurance to these 
households. Households living on council estates are twice as likely to be burgled compared 
to non-council estate households (Safe and Demos, 2005).  
2.8. Over-indebtedness 
Over-indebtedness is a complex phenomenon closely linked to the financial inclusion agenda. 
It can be caused and sustained by a host of factors, including high finance costs, low income, 
life-cycle events, changing circumstances, income shocks and expenditure hikes. This issue 
has become particularly prominent since the onslaught of the credit crunch and the recession. 
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One of the key measures of indebtedness is landlord and mortgage repossessions (Chart 2.3). 
 
Claims issued refers to the moment when a claimant begins an action for an order for 
possession of residential property by issuing a claim in a county court. Orders made refers to 
when a court, following a judicial hearing, grants an order for possession immediately 
entitling claimant to apply for warrant to have defendant evicted. However, even where a 
warrant for possession is issued, the parties can still negotiate a compromise to prevent 
eviction. 
Mortgage claims and orders have increased steadily and considerably since 2004. From 2003 
to 2008 the number of mortgage claims and orders rose by 154% and 220% respectively. 
There are three main factors accounting for the rise in mortgage repossession claims and 
orders: 
- Rising financing costs: Between 2003 and 2007 there was a considerable growth in 
average interest rates increasing the financing burden for many mortgage holders. The 
average interest rate for a standard variable mortgage rose from 4.19% in 2003 to 6.32% 
in 2007 (CML data). This started falling again in 2008 and averaged 4.32% in 2009 
(CML data). 
- Falling affordability: The median mortgage advance-to-income multiple for first-time 
buyers and all buyers in the UK – a key measure of affordability – rose by over 15% from 
2003 to 2008.  
- Rising unemployment: While unemployment in Leeds remained low and stable from 
around 2004 until quarter two of 2008, the number of job claimants increased by over 
20% from quarter two of 2008 to quarter three of 2009. This is likely to have put further 
upward pressure on mortgage repossessions. 
Landlord possession claims and orders in Leeds increased from 2003 to 2005, fell from 2005 
to 2007 and then increased slightly in 2008. Unlike homeowners, tenants have not 
experienced the same rise in living costs (linked to the rise in interest rates). Moreover, the 
rise in housing prices will not have affected tenants to the same extent. 
The trends in possession claims and orders are likely to reflect changes among social housing 
landlords. Possession actions by social landlords increased considerably in the decade leading 
to 2003 due to three factors (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005):  
- A rise in multiple indebtedness; 
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- Reduced responsiveness of housing benefits systems, due to increased demands on 
claimants and staff following the introduction of the Housing Benefit Verification 
Framework in 1998; 
- A rise in employment rates among social tenants, especially in low-paid, temporary work, 
which often led to discontinuation of housing benefits. 
Nationally possession claims have been falling since 2003 as staff and tenants have adjusted 
to the changes in the housing benefit system as social housing landlords have used more staff 
discretion in dealing with rent debtors (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005). 
Following the credit crunch and the rise in repossessions, the UK government has introduced 
two main schemes to support struggling homeowners: 
- Mortgage Rescue Scheme: A £200m package of measures designed to prevent some of 
the most vulnerable families losing their homes. This occurs either through RSL 
provision of equity loan or government mortgage to rent. It aims to aid 6,000 
homeowners over the next two years. As part of the 2009 budget, the scheme was 
extended to help people in negative equity.  
- Homeowners Mortgage Support: Scheme announced April 21 2009 to assist homeowners 
experiencing temporary drops in income. Under this scheme, eligible homeowners will be 
able to make smaller mortgage repayments for up to two years, without the risk of losing 
their homes.  
2.8.1. Money and debt advice 
More generally, governments have funded free-to-client debt advice. There are a range of 
organisations which provide free-to-client face-to-face debt and money advice, including 
specialised debt advice agencies (e.g. CABx, Law Centres), local authorities (e.g. Welfare 
Rights services), social housing landlords, lawyers and community organisations. The main 
players in provision include Citizen Advice Bureaux, Law Centres, Social Housing Landlords 
and Welfare Rights sections of local authorities. Although open to all, many if not most of the 
clients of the not-for-profit sector are vulnerable households living on a low income. Their 
problems are often multi-faceted, going beyond pure debt problems, and they often require 
considerable support. 
The sector is funded by a range of organisations, including local authorities, government 
departments, social housing landlords and foundations. The perhaps largest funding pot for 
face-to-face money advice is the Financial Inclusion Fund, which in its first round provided 
£47.5 million to recruit and train 500 debt advisers, and which provided advice to nearly 
70,000 households (HM Treasury, 2007). For the period from 2008 to 2011, nearly 30% of 
the £135 million Financial Inclusion Fund is destined to generic money advice (HM Treasury, 
2007). This programme will end in March 2011 unless the current Government decides to 
renew the funding, which seems unlikely. 
In the UK there are numerous private sector organisations providing debt advice and 
remedies on a commercial basis. To access advice through this sector, the client must pay set-
up and monthly management fees which are typically added on the payments going to 
creditors. These fees vary, but a survey of the sector conducted by Collard (2009) found that 
the fees ranged from 2.5% to nearly 18% with 15% being the most common figure. The same 
survey found that the companies charged up to £500 in set-up fees which are often taken by 
retaining the first payments (Collard, 2009). 
The clients of the commercial debt management sector tend to live on higher incomes and be 
more likely to be employed. Commercial debt advice companies also tend to focus mainly or 
exclusively on unsecured credit debts rather than secured debts, or household, utility or 
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council tax bills. The survey conducted by Collard (2009) also suggests the majority of 
commercial debt companies offer advice via telephone rather than face-to-face.  
There are no precise estimates of the size of the sector. In its report on the UK Government‟s 
over-indebtedness strategy and funded debt advice provision (FIF2), the National Audit 
Office (2010) noted that 56,000 companies are permitted by the Office of Fair Trading to 
provide debt advice. A recent review of the fee-charging debt management sector found that 
there were over 150 companies offering DMPs for a fee (Collard, 2009). 
A number of concerns about the commercial sector have been raised by campaigners, 
creditors and debt advice practitioners (Collard, 2009): 
- Profit not client-outcome driven: Ultimately the bottom-line for the commercial sector is 
profit. It is feared that the companies recommend to clients the most profitable debt 
remedy rather than the most appropriate. 
- Unreliable payments of creditors: Because commercial companies tend to draw set-up 
fees from the first few payments, creditors continue to chasing debt exacerbating the 
clients‟ debt problems. 
There are now a range of standards and guidelines which a number of commercial companies 
are to follow. Most notably the Debt Managers Standards Association (DEMSA) has a Code 
of Practice which was approved by the OFT in 2008. 
2.9. Fuel poverty 
Fuel poverty – the inability to afford sufficient warmth for health and comfort – is a serious 
and debilitating form of deprivation and has been a concern for government since 1999. Fuel 
costs may crowd out other essential spending, such as food and clothing.  
The most widely accepted definition of fuel poverty is where a household needs to spend 
10% or more of its income to meet fuel costs to ensure that the home is heated to an adequate 
standard.
4
 In England there are around 4 million households which can be classified as fuel 
poor, of which 3.2 million are classed as vulnerable (Table 2.6). There has been a sharp 
increase in fuel poverty in England since 2005 in particular. 
Table 2.6: Fuel poverty in England (number of households) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Households in fuel 
poverty 
1.2m 1.2m 1.5m 2.4m 2.9m 4.0m 
Vulnerable households 
in fuel poverty 
1.0m 1.0m 1.2m 2.0m 2.3m 3.2m 
Source: Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (for England) Sixth Annual Report 2008 
There are three main factors leading to fuel poverty (DEFRA, 2008): 
- Energy efficiency: The lack of efficient heating and effective insulation is a contributing 
factor to fuel poverty as it increases the cost of heating a house. In 2006, 28% of English 
households live in non-decent homes (DEFRA, 2008). 
- Energy prices: Energy prices have risen considerably over the past five years or so. In 
real terms, the price of gas increased by 42% and the price of electricity increased by 29% 
from 2003 to the end of 2007 (Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (for England), 2007). 
Households who use prepayment meters pay more for their fuel than households paying 
direct debit or in cash. Per year, a prepayment customer pays £145 more than a customer 
on direct debit (Fuel Poverty Advisory Group (for England), 2007). The difference 
                                                 
4
 According to the World Health Organisation adequate warmth is 21 degrees Celsius in the living room and 18 
degrees Celsius in other rooms. 
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between these customer groups has also increased over the past three years (Fuel Poverty 
Advisory Group (for England), 2007). 
- Household income: Living on a low income is one of the most important factors driving 
fuel poverty (Conaty and Bendle, 2002). Nearly 80% of the fuel poor are classified as 
vulnerable. 
There are several groups which are especially vulnerable to living in fuel poverty. The elderly 
are especially likely to be fuel poor. They spend more time in the home and they live on a 
low, fixed income. It is estimated that one in three pensioner households live in fuel poverty 
(Thompson, 2008). Households with children, especially single parent households and 
households with disabled household members are also vulnerable. A common denominator 
for many of the fuel poor is that they live on a low income (Conaty and Bendle, 2002). They 
also often lack access to and are less prone to using more advantageous methods of paying 
for fuel, such as direct debit. 
The UK government response to fuel poverty has been to develop three types of interventions 
(DTI, 2001). 
First, the government has devised a number of interventions to increase the energy efficiency 
of the housing stock of England. Salient interventions include:  
- Energy Efficiency Advice Centres: The Energy Savings Trust and Energy Saving 
Scotland now have 21 centres across the UK offering people advice on a range of issues 
relating to energy efficiency. 
- Warm front: Warm Front is a key tool in tackling fuel poverty in private sector housing. 
Grants of up to £3,500 (£6,000 where oil, low carbon or renewable technologies are 
involved) are available to households who own or rent privately and who receive means-
tested benefits. Between June 2000 and April 2008, 1.7 million received Warm Front 
grants (DEFRA, 2008). 
- Carbon Emissions Reduction Target: CERT is an energy supplier obligation under which 
energy suppliers must deliver measures that will reduce carbon emissions by a certain 
amount. For the period of 2008-2011, it is estimated that this will lead to an investment 
by energy companies of around £2.8 billion (DEFRA website), 40% of which has to be 
targeted at vulnerable and low-income households. 
- Decent Homes Standard: This standard has a component relating to efficient heating and 
effective insulation. The Department of Communities and Local Government expects 
95% of all social housing in England to meet or exceed the standard by 2010. A specific 
deadline must be agreed for the remaining 5% after that. 
A second group of interventions has centred on exerting downward pressure on fuel bills by 
ensuring a transparent and competitive energy market. The energy supplier regulator Ofgem 
has an important role in ensuring that this happens. One of the key issues Ofgem has sought 
to address is the unfair price differentials between prepayment and direct debit. Recently 
Ofgem has proposed license conditions that differentials must be accounted for by cost and a 
ban on unjust price discrimination.  
A final government policy relating to fuel poverty is increasing the disposable income of fuel 
poor households. Salient interventions include: 
- Tax credits: Tax credits are payments from government targeted at the working poor and 
low-income households with children.  
- Winter fuel payment scheme: Winter fuel payment is an annual payment for people over 
60. Around 12 million people in the UK received such a payment in the 2007/08 winter 
(DEFRA, 2008). 
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- Cold weather payments: Payments to poorer pensioners and other eligible households in 
weeks of extremely cold weather. Around 500,000 such payments are made annually 
(DEFRA, 2008). 
- Benefit entitlement checks: Benefit entitlement checks are part of fuel poverty initiatives 
such as Warm Front. 
2.10. Implications for survey results 
So far we have presented and discussed the trends and changes in financial exclusion and 
policy since 2004. But what are the implications for the survey analysis? How will these 
trends have affected the Repeat survey results for 2010 compared with the Original survey of 
2004? Based on national, regional and local trends and changes since 2004, we would expect 
the following changes of the survey: 
- Access to financial products linked to credit scoring: Given the tightening of lending 
policy and the rise in unemployment nationally and locally, one would expect to see an 
increase in the proportion of credit impaired households (i.e. people with a bad or 
impaired credit history). In turn this would likely lead to a reduction in the access to and 
ownership of credit-scored financial products (e.g. loans, insurance etc). 
- Banking and transaction services: Judging by the national progress on reducing the 
number and proportion of unbanked households, we expect to see increased bank account 
ownership among respondents, though cash-based budgeting and money management 
(e.g. use of pre-payment meters, aversion to use of direct debits etc) is likely to persist. 
- Over-indebtedness: The picture on over-indebtedness is likely to be more mixed. National 
evidence suggests that households that can are reducing their debts, while households 
experiencing reduced earnings from redundancies or reduced working hours are likely to 
be struggling with their debts. Based on national and local statistics, we would expect to 
see a larger proportion of homeowners struggling to service their mortgage. However, 
such households are unlikely to want to participate in a survey. 
- Savings and assets: If national and regional statistics are anything to go by, one would 
expect little or no change in the propensity to save, especially for low-income households. 
- Home contents insurance: Similarly national statistics suggest that HCI ownership rates 
among low-income households and social housing tenants are persistently low. There 
would be little reason to suggest any change among survey respondents since 2004. 
- Fuel poverty: National fuel poverty has been on the rise and there has been little change 
in terms of the use of pre-payment meters. We would expect the survey results to reflect 
this. 
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3. Evolution of financial exclusion in Leeds since 2004 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the analysis of the survey data. 
Throughout the chapter we make references to three separate samples: 
 Original Survey: In 2004 a survey was conducted of 410 households in deprived 
neighbourhoods. 
 Repeat Survey: In 2010 the same survey was conducted with 602 households in 
the same neighbourhoods in the same neighbourhoods to see if the nature and 
magnitude of financial exclusion had changed since the last survey was conducted 
 Extended survey: In 2010, a further 300 households in less deprived 
neighbourhoods were surveyed. This latter sample focused on homeowners and 
intended to provide information about the extent of financial exclusion arising 
from the economic recession in recent years. 
The same questionnaire was used on all three samples (the Questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix C). The survey methodology is detailed in Appendix  A.  
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. After discussing the impact of 
the recession, the chapter goes on to analyse and discuss the evolution in the access to 
and use of financial services in Leeds since 2004. It should be noted that comparing 
the results of the two surveys is complex due to the impact of the recession. Any 
changes which indicate greater degrees of financial exclusion does not necessarily 
mean any interventions have had no impact, rather the degree of exclusion could have 
been even greater were it not for the interventions. An overview of the sample is can 
be found in Appendix  B. 
All differences termed as significant are statistically significantly different and refer to 
the sampling tolerance table in Appendix  A. 
3.2. The impact of the recession 
The recession is likely to have had considerable impact on the Repeat and Extended 
samples and thus on any observed differences between the Repeat and the Original 
samples. This section discusses the impact of the recession for the Repeat and 
Extended sample. 
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Chart 3.1 displays perceived impact of the recession on Repeat and Extended survey 
respondents.  
 
The respondents were asked to rate the impact of the recession on household finances 
on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is no impact at all and 10 is a great deal of impact). 
Chart 3.1 displays these scores grouped into not much impact (1-3), average impact 
(4-7) and significant impact (8-10). 
The majority of the respondents of both the Repeat and Extended samples thought the 
recession had impacted on their finances to some degree. Around 30% of the Repeat 
sample and 37% of the Extended sample stated the recession had not had much 
impact on their finances. Respondents in the Extended survey found the impact of the 
recession less with only 30% reporting a significant impact compared with 40% for 
the Repeat survey respondents. Respondents with children, particularly in the Repeat 
sample, were more likely to say the recession had an impact on their finances. 
All respondents rating the impact on their finances as 5 or above were asked what this 
impact had been. The main reasons were price rises making it more difficult to pay 
bills and someone in the household being made redundant. Respondents in the Repeat 
sample were more concerned about rising prices but the proportion of respondents 
who said someone had been made redundant or could not find a job was similar. 
A total of 11% in the Repeat sample and 10% in the Extended sample said they had 
problems with accessing finance as a result of the credit crunch. Almost all of these 
people had not been able to access credit they wanted, or already knew that they 
would not be able to get any credit. 
When asked about the impact of the recession a number of respondents mentioned 
being made redundant or having their wages reduced.  
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Chart 3.2 shows the change in employment conditions in the past 12 months for the 
Repeat and Extended sample. 
 
One in ten respondents in the Repeat survey and 14% in the Extended sample said 
someone in their household had been made redundant in the previous twelve months 
(some of whom had found another job). Around 11% of respondents in the Repeat 
sample and 9% on the Extended sample had their working hours cut back and 5% in 
both samples said their wages or salary had been reduced. This means that about one 
in four households across both samples had experienced redundancy, reduced hours or 
a cut in pay during the previous twelve months. 
3.3. Changes in financial exclusion in Leeds since 2004 
Having discussed the potential impact of the recession, this section analyses and 
discusses the changes in terms of the extent and nature of financial exclusion since 
2004. 
3.3.1. Banking and transaction services 
The access and use of banking and transaction services are at the heart of the financial 
inclusion agenda. Based on the review of the national evidence and statistics, we 
would expect to see a rise in bank account ownership and a persistence of cash-based 
money management. 
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Table 3.1 compares the access and use of banking and transaction services across the 
three samples. 
Table 3.1: Access and use of banking and transaction services (%) 
 Original sample Repeat sample Extended sample 
Account ownership    
Bank account 70 81 95 
Current account 54 … … 
Basic bank account 16 … … 
Credit card 25 21 40 
Store card 9 5 10 
Refusal bank account 16 9 8 
ATM usage    
Never use ATM … 26 16 
Use free ATM … 67 78 
Use charging ATM … 1 1 
Use both … 6 6 
Account usage    
Direct debit for fuel bills 18 26 61 
N 410 594 300 
Account facilities    
Debit card 31 89 96 
Check book  32 27 57 
Overdraft facility … 33 55 
Direct debits … 70 90 
N  483 284 
Receipt benefits    
Into bank account … 72 86 
Collected using POCA … 27 12 
Other … 3 0 
Number respondents  462 174 
 
A total of 81% of respondents in the Repeat sample said that they had a bank or 
building society current account. This is a significant increase from the 70% found in 
the Original survey. Many of those without a bank account use the Post Office 
Account Card (POCA). A total of 96% of the respondents in the Repeat survey have 
either a bank account or a POCA. This is a significant increase from the 70% of 
respondents who either had a bank account or POCA in the Original survey. 
This increase most likely reflects increased awareness of the basic bank account and 
the push for benefits to be paid into bank accounts. Half of the Repeat survey 
respondents said they had heard of this type of account, a significant increase from the 
36% found in the Original sample. Awareness in the Extended sample was similar at 
48%. In the Repeat and Extended samples, nearly all respondents in receipt of benefits 
had these paid into a bank account or POCA. In the Extended sample, 85% of 
respondents had a bank account. Again owner occupiers (99%) were the most likely 
to have an account compared with 81% of those in social housing. 
In the Repeat survey, the majority of owner occupiers (96%) had a bank account. The 
majority of couples with children (95%) also had a bank account. The groups least 
likely to have a bank account were men under 60 living alone (66%) and pensioner 
only households (69%). In the Original survey a higher proportion of owner occupiers 
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(86%) had a bank account, than social housing tenants (66%). People aged over 60 
were the least likely to have a bank account (61%). 
In the Repeat survey, the main reasons for not having a bank account were that people 
had no money to put into an account (54% of those without an account) or that there 
was no point as they used the post office to collect their pension or benefits. The 
reasons were largely the same in the Original survey. 
9% of respondents in the Repeat survey and 8% in the Extended sample said that in 
the last three years they or someone in their family had tried to open an account and 
been refused. This is a significantly lower percentage than in the Original survey 
when 16% of respondents had tried to open an account and been refused, with 8% 
saying this was within the last two years. 
There is also a significant increase in the percentage of households paying fuel bills 
using direct debits since 2004. This is a positive and unexpected finding. National 
evidence suggests that while bank account ownership has risen, the use of cash-based 
money management and bill payment has persisted. 
In terms of ATMs, only 1% of both the Repeat and Extended samples relied 
exclusively on fee-charging ATMs, while 6% sometimes used fee-charging ATMs. 
Overall, respondents in the Extended sample were slightly more likely to use a cash 
machine compared with the Repeat survey respondents. 
3.3.2. Savings and assets 
Increasing the propensity to save and the asset endowment of households has been a 
key part of the financial inclusion agenda of the UK government. Households and 
individuals who save may be in better position to cope with income shocks, life-cycle 
events (e.g. old age and retirement) and expenditure hikes without relying on the 
public safety nets. All available statistics suggest that, despite numerous government 
interventions and tax incentives, there is a long-term decline in both level of savings 
and propensity to save. 
Chart 3.3 compares the level of savings for the Original, Repeat and Extended sample. 
 
The level of savings is well below the national average for each of the Original, 
Repeat and Extended surveys. In terms of the Repeat survey respondents, 75% had no 
savings at all or savings of below £1,000. In comparison, nationally 34% of the 
population have no savings at all and 20% have savings of less than £1,500 (FRS 
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2007/2008). Similarly, 82% of the Original survey respondents had no savings at all 
or savings of below £1,000. At the time 28% of the national population had no 
savings at all and 21% had savings of less than £1,500 (FRS 2001/02). 
Respondents to the Repeat survey were significantly more likely to have no savings 
compared with the Original survey respondents. While 37% of the Original survey 
respondents had no savings, in the Repeat survey this had increased to 67%. Levels of 
savings fell across all levels from 2004 to 2010. 
It is interesting to note that a similar proportion of households in the Extended sample 
had no savings relative to the Original sample. This may suggest that financial 
exclusion has been on the rise in less deprived communities. In the Extended sample, 
40% had no savings at all with a further 6% having less than £100. The level of 
savings of those in social housing in the Extended survey area was much the same as 
in the Original area but owner occupiers and privately renting tenants had slightly 
higher levels of savings than those in the Original sample. 
92% of lone parents in the Repeat survey had no savings at all or had less than £100. 
Owner occupiers were more likely to have some savings than other tenures.  A total of 
51% of owner occupiers had no savings at all compared with 83% of social housing 
tenants and 84% of those renting privately. 85% of workless households had no 
savings at all or less than £100. 
Chart 3.4 compares how respondents save. 
 
There is a significant drop in the likelihood of saving with a bank or building society. 
Just under a quarter of the Repeat sample had a bank or building society savings 
account, compared with half of the Original survey respondents. On the other hand, 
there has also been a decrease in the number of people using informal savings 
methods, such as saving in jars and envelopes or by asking relatives to look after 
money. There are no significant changes across the other ways of saving. There is a 
slight decrease in the proportion of respondents saving with a credit union. 
It is worrying to note that the respondents of the Extended sample, generally more 
affluent than the Original and Repeat survey samples, are only slightly more likely to 
save by using a bank or building society account than the respondents of the Original 
survey. In addition they are more likely to save money in a jar/ envelope than the 
Repeat sample. Further, the Extended sample respondents are significantly less likely 
to save, in any form, compared with the Original survey despite being more affluent. 
Chart 3.5 compares the reasons for saving. 
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Overall, nearly two in three of the Repeat sample did not save at all (63%), which is 
twice as many as the Original sample. Across all purposes for saving, a significantly 
greater proportion of the Original survey respondents saved compared with the Repeat 
sample. The largest fall is in the category “saving to buy things I want or need.” 
Chart 3.6 compares how often respondents save. 
 
There is a significant drop in the proportion of respondents who save regularly, and 
especially, those who save as and when they can. The proportion of respondents 
saving “as and when I can”, fell from 41% to 18% from the Original to the Repeat 
survey. Again the respondents in the Extended sample were not any more likely to 
save regularly than the Original and Repeat survey respondents. On the contrary, they 
are, if anything, less likely to save regardless of frequency. 
The significant drop in the propensity to save, the frequency of saving and also the 
level of saving from the Original to the Repeat survey is most likely a function of the 
recent economic crisis and rising living costs for low-income households (e.g. rising 
fuel costs). The fact that the less deprived respondents in the Extended sample are also 
less likely to save than the Original survey respondents suggests that this is a problem 
which goes beyond the traditional group of financially excluded. 
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3.3.3. Affordable credit and sub-prime lending 
Enabling low-income households to access affordable credit at the expense of sub-
prime borrowing has been a key priority for the Government. As research by 
Kempson et al (2009) suggests, the preference for home collection of payments 
increases the cost at which loans can be delivered. Moreover, their preference for cash 
payments as opposed to electronic transfers is an important barrier to graduation to the 
mainstream financial sector. This is not only because it is the only way in which 
banks will accept repayments but also because it is a means of building a credit score 
which is also essential to access bank lending. 
Table 3.2 compares borrowing and credit exclusion experienced by the respondents. 
Table 3.2: Borrowing and credit exclusion (%) 
 Original sample Repeat sample Extended sample 
Borrowing    
Mainstream borrowing 35 26 31 
Sub-prime borrowing 31 28 24 
Card ownership    
Credit card 25 21 40 
Store card 9 5 3 
Credit exclusion    
Refused credit 9 14 11 
Number respondents 410 594 300 
 
Since 2004, there has been a fall in the proportion of households with a credit card 
and a significant decrease in the proportion of households with store cards. In the 
Repeat survey, a fifth of respondents (21%) said they had a credit card and 5% had a 
store card (that is a credit card to use in a specific shop), compared with 25% and 9% 
respectively in the Original survey. A total of 22% of the Repeat survey have either a 
credit card or a store card. A significantly higher proportion of households had credit 
cards (40%) in the Extended sample compared with the Repeat and the Original 
survey respondents. This is not surprising given that the respondents of the Extended 
survey were more likely to be in employment and be on higher incomes. 
Overall there is a significant fall in mainstream borrowing from 2004 to 2010. The 
respondents in the Extended sample were also less likely to have mainstream 
borrowing compared with the Original survey respondents, albeit less pronounced 
than the difference between the Original and Repeat surveys. Coupled with the 
significant rise in the number of respondents having been refused credit in the Repeat 
survey compared with the Original Survey, this would suggest an increase in credit 
exclusion possibly due to a tightening of lending policy by lenders. 
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Chart 3.7 shows the sources of credit that the respondents have currently.  
 
The proportion of households using mainstream lending has fallen significantly since 
the Original survey. In 2004, just over 50% of respondents had some form of 
mainstream credit compared with less than 30% in 2010. Compared with the Repeat 
survey, a significantly higher proportion of the Original survey respondents had an HP 
agreement (8% compared with 2%) and a bank loan (9% compared with 4%). It is 
interesting to note that also the respondents of the Extended survey, who are generally 
less deprived than the Original and Repeat survey respondents, are less likely to have 
mainstream borrowing compared with the Original survey respondents. 
There has been a fall in sub-prime borrowing since the Original survey. In 2004, 26% 
had some form of sub-prime borrowing. In the Repeat sample this figure had fallen to 
22%. Most notably there has been a significant fall in the percentage of respondents 
using home credit and catalogue credit. Sub-prime lenders have also been affected by 
the financial and economic crisis and it is possible that they in response have 
tightened their lending criteria excluding many low-income households they would 
have served in the past. The Extended sample respondents are less likely to resort to 
sub-prime borrowing. This is probably because they are more likely to have credit 
cards which they may be able to resort to. 
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Table 3.3 compares awareness and membership of the credit union. 
Table 3.3: Awareness and membership of credit union (%) 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
Heard of credit union 30 52 45 
Member of credit union 6 9 5 
Number of respondents 410 594 300 
There has been a significant increase in awareness of the credit union since 2004. Just 
over half (52%) of the Repeat sample had heard of Leeds City Credit Union which is 
an increase from the 30% found in the Original sample. A total of 9% of respondents 
in the Repeat survey and 5% in the Extended sample said they were members of the 
Credit Union. This is an increase from the 6% found in 2004. 
While the survey suggests that membership rates have not increased, the membership 
of Leeds City Credit Union has increased since the Original survey was conducted in 
2004 as is depicted in chart 3.8 
.  
The number of adult members had more than doubled since 2004. Today the credit 
union has more than 21,500 adult members and 26,000 members if we include junior 
accounts and members under 18 years of age. In 2004 the same figures were 10,000 
and 12,000 respectively. 
3.3.4. Insurance 
Despite the renewed emphasis on extending the coverage of Home Contents Insurance 
(HCI), historical data suggests that the ownership of HCI has remained fairly stable 
over the last 15 years. The Association of British Insurers (2007) reports that despite 
the fall in costs in real terms of around 40% from 1994 to 2007, the proportion of the 
population with home contents and building insurance has remained relatively stable. 
In particular, ownership of HCI has remained low among social housing tenants and 
low-income households. 
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Table 3.4 compares HCI ownership rates for the respondents. 
Table 3.4: Home Content Ownership by group (%) 
 Original sample Repeat sample Extended sample 
Total 39 32 69 
Owner  74 70 86 
Social housing 35 22 24 
Private rented 26 4 39 
18-29 36 16 40 
30-44 41 33 70 
45-59 59 39 80 
60+ 54 49 92 
Lone Parent 31 14 26 
Couple with children 36 40 74 
Working household 59 46 79 
Workless household 28 20 52 
White 48 33 71 
Asian 33 37 58 
Black 23 23 83 
Number of respondents 410 594 300 
Just under a third of respondents (32%) in the Repeat survey said they had contents 
insurance, significantly fewer than was found in the Original survey when it stood at 
39%. In the Repeat survey, a higher proportion of owner occupiers (70%) had 
contents insurance but this fell to only 22% of social housing tenants and 4% of those 
with a private landlord. This is in line with the national picture. Data from the most 
recent FRS suggests that the proportion of social tenants without insurance has 
remained stable at around 64%. 
The main reason for not having insurance, which was similar for both the Original and 
the Repeat samples, was the cost. Relatively few of those without contents insurance 
said that they had tried to get insurance (9%). 
In the Extended sample area, a higher proportion (69%) had contents insurance 
ranging from 86% of owner occupiers to 24% of those in social housing and 39% of 
those renting privately. In both the Repeat and the Extended sample, the proportion of 
respondents having contents insurance rose with age. 
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3.3.5. Over-indebtedness 
The level of over-indebtedness has risen considerably in the UK and Leeds. This is 
evidenced by a considerable rise in mortgage repossessions since 2004. 
Chart 3.9 compares the level of worry of getting into debt for the Original, Repeat and 
the Extended surveys.  
 
Overall, 25% of respondents in the Repeat survey were very worried and 34% fairly 
worried about getting into debt. Households with a mortgage, women, lone parents 
and households where someone had a mental health problem were the most likely to 
be worried about getting into debt. A total of 67% of those who had no savings or less 
than £100 savings were very or fairly worried about getting into debt. 
Respondents were significantly more worried about being in debt than they were in 
the Original survey when 16% were very worried and 24% were fairly worried about 
being in debt. Although the concern of all groups has increased since 2004, the level 
of concern about being in debt amongst owner occupiers has increased more than 
amongst social housing tenants. Respondents in the Extended survey were just as 
concerned about debts with 24% very worried and 33% fairly worried. 
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Respondents were asked to say which, if any, bills they were behind with currently 
(Chart 3.10). 
 
The proportion of respondents that are currently behind with one or more bills has 
risen significantly since the Original survey. In 2004, 15% were behind with one or 
more bills compared with 26% in the Repeat survey. In the Extended survey, 16% of 
respondents were currently behind with one or more payments. In the Extended 
sample, a higher proportion of respondents had fallen behind with credit payments 
such as overdrafts or credit card bills, with fewer encountering problems with utility 
payments. 
In all three surveys, people aged 60 or over were the least likely to have fallen behind 
with bills (14% in the Repeat survey, 5% in the Original survey and 5% in the 
Extended survey). In both the Original and Repeat survey, social housing tenants were 
far more likely to have fallen behind with bills than owner-occupiers. 
Nationally, 25% of working age adults in workless households were in arrears with 
one or more household bills, compared to 5% in fully working households 
(Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion, Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2009). In the 
Repeat survey, 32% of all workless households were in arrears with household bills, 
compared with 16% in the Extended sample. These figures increase to 37% and 27% 
if pensioner only households are excluded. These figures cannot be compared exactly 
as the report cited does not list which bills are included under household bills and this 
report may have included more items. However, they do indicate that in the most 
deprived parts of the city, the proportion of households in arrears with household bills 
is above the national average. 
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Table 3.5 compares the reasons for falling behind on payments for the Original, 
Repeat and the Extended samples. 
Table 3.5: Reasons for falling behind on payments (%) 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
Insufficient income to cover all expenses 50 54 31 
Unemployment, redundancy* 21 25 40 
Short time working … 11 6 
Physical ill health 12 7 8 
Family break up** 12 6 2 
Errors in housing benefit 10 4 4 
Became pregnant, had a child 4 2 4 
Partner left, leaving me with debts … 2 - 
Debts incurred by other HH member 0 2 2 
Mental ill health*** … 2 - 
Tax credit overpayments 0 1 - 
Other 9 5 4 
Not sure 6 3 6 
Number respondents 139 180 47 
Notes: *Short term working was included in this category, **partner left was included in this category, 
***mental health not included in the Original survey 
In the Repeat survey, the most frequently cited reasons were that their income was 
insufficient to meet all their expenses (53%). In the Extended sample, the main reason 
was unemployment or redundancy. Other reasons include short time working; ill 
health and family break up. This is largely similar to the reasons mentioned by the 
respondents to the Original survey. 
Given the rise in repossessions and number of households struggling with their 
mortgage payments in the UK and Leeds, numerous questions around mortgages were 
included in the Repeat and Extended surveys. 
Across the two samples, there were 166 respondents who lived in a property with a 
mortgage. Given the relatively low number of respondents with a mortgage in each of 
the samples, they are considered together here.  
Table 3.6 displays the time respondents have had their mortgage at the time of the 
interview. 
Table 3.6: Length of time respondents had their mortgage (%) 
 Total Repeat 
sample 
Upper 
Armley 
Rothwell Yeadon Gipton 
Wood 
1 year 3 8 4 0 0 0 
2-3 years 10 17 4 4 10 8 
4-5 years 23 25 22 13 28 24 
6-10 years 31 32 26 25 34 35 
> 10 years 33 19 43 58 28 32 
Number respondents 166 53 23 24 29 37 
A small number of respondents (3%) had taken out their mortgage within the past 
year with a further 10% having taken it out in the past two to three years. One in three 
respondents had their mortgage for more than ten years. 
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Chart 3.11 displays the level of deposit paid by area. 
 
Just over a quarter of respondents (29%) said they had a 100% mortgage and 22% had 
a deposit from selling a previous property. A quarter of respondents had paid a deposit 
but a quarter did not know the level paid. The amount of deposit paid ranged from 1% 
(2 respondents, 5% of those who paid a deposit) to 80%. The most common deposit 
was 5%, one in three of those who had paid a deposit. 
The majority of respondents had their mortgage from a bank (33%) or a building 
society (54%) with 5% from a finance company. The main reasons for choosing their 
lender was that it was the best or cheapest deal (45%), that they already banked with 
that lender (13%) or that it was recommended by a financial adviser or broker. Other 
reasons included it being a trustworthy lender, being employed by the lender or that is 
was flexible. 
A total of 6% said it was the only one that would lend to them, with one respondent 
also saying that this was because she was a lone parent and another that it was 
because they were self employed. One respondent said this was the only lender who 
would give them a 100% mortgage. 
Just over one in three respondents (37%) had a fixed rate mortgage, 30% a standard 
variable rate and 8% a tracker. One in five respondents did not know what type of 
mortgage it was. In some cases this was because it was their parents‟ mortgage. The 
survey asked what the interest rate was but two in three respondents did not know. 
14% of those with a mortgage said they were currently having, or expected to have 
problems with renegotiating their mortgage in the next couple of years. This figure 
was higher (23%) among the Repeat survey respondents compared with the Extended 
sample areas (11%). 
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Chart 3.12 displays the ease with which the respondents pay their mortgages. 
 
Although the number of respondents who are falling behind with their payments is 
quite small (12), this would translate to a significant number of households across 
Leeds as a whole. 
When asked what they had done about their situation, the following responses were 
given: 
- Been in contact with lender, 3 respondents 
- Arranged to pay off so much a month, 2 respondents 
- Pay interest only, 2 respondents 
- We are trying to pay more each month, 2 respondents 
- Nothing yet - we have only missed one payment, 1 respondent 
- Nothing, 1 respondent 
Five of the 166 respondents with a mortgage said they had something else secured 
against their home. Three of these respondents were either finding it hard to pay their 
mortgage or were falling behind. A total of 3% of the Repeat survey respondents and 
2% of the Extended survey respondents had used a credit card to pay off a mortgage 
or other loans. 
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3.3.6. Fuel poverty 
Fuel poverty – the inability to afford sufficient warmth for health and comfort – has 
risen drastically since the Original survey was conducted. In England there are around 
4 million households which can be classified as fuel poor, of which 3.2 million are 
classed as vulnerable. This constitutes an increase of 70% since 2004.  
Chart 3.13 compares how the respondents perceive they are managing their fuel bills. 
 
In the Repeat survey, almost half the respondents were having some difficulty with 
paying their fuel bills. Overall, 9% said they managed very easily and 38% fairly 
easily. A total of 36% said they had some difficulty and 14% said they found it very 
difficult. Again there is a significantly higher proportion of respondents finding it 
difficult than was found in the Original survey (when 17% said they had some 
difficulty or found it very difficult). 
In the Extended sample, a quarter of respondents had some difficulty paying their fuel 
bills, with 16% saying this was very easy, 55% quite easy but 20% had some 
difficulty and 6% said it was very difficult. 
People who paid their fuel bills by direct debit were less likely than all others to say 
they were having difficulties with paying their fuel bills. However, this is likely to be 
because less deprived households tend to pay their bills by this method. 
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Chart 3.14 compares how the respondents pay their fuel bills. 
 
The proportion of households paying their fuel bills using direct debit has risen 
significantly since the Original survey. This is a very positive finding as fuel bills tend 
to be lower when paying by direct debit. However, there has also been a significant 
increase in the use of prepayment meters, which often attract a higher charge. The 
increase in the use of both these payment methods appears to happen at the expense of 
paying fuel using cheques or cash, which fell from 35% in the Original survey to 19% 
in the Repeat survey. 
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4. Conclusions and recommendations 
4.1. Introduction 
This report has analysed and discussed the changes in financial exclusion in Leeds 
since 2004. It has done so based on a comparison of survey data from two surveys 
(Original and Repeat) conducted with households in deprived communities in 2004 
and 2010 respectively. Any changes have been discussed in the context of the national 
financial inclusion policy context and national trends in financial exclusion. 
4.2. National context 
Nationally a plethora of financial inclusion interventions have been introduced since 
2004, for example the launch of the Financial Inclusion Fund and the introduction of 
the Child Trust Fund. Numerous changes have also occurred in terms of the nature 
and extent of financial exclusion since then.  
There has been considerable progress in terms of the access to bank accounts both in 
England and in Yorkshire and the Humber. In the latter, the percentage of households 
with current accounts has risen from 85% to 90% from 1999 to 2009. Also the 
proportion of households without any form of account fell from 7% in both England 
and the region in 1999 to 3-4% in 2009. This is likely to be the result of the 
introduction of no-frill bank accounts as well as the move to payment of benefits 
directly into bank accounts. The access to free ATMs has also improved with the 
setting of targets for free ATMs in deprived areas. 
However, on many other counts, financial exclusion has increased or remained 
entrenched over the past six years. The propensity to save has remained largely stable 
and has even fallen slightly, reflecting the complex and structural set of factors 
affecting saving patterns.  
The ownership of home contents insurance has remained low for tenants and low-
income households despite falls in the cost of such insurance in real terms. There has 
been a surge in over-indebtedness as evidenced by the rise in mortgage repossessions 
since 2004. Fuel poverty has increased sharply especially since 2006. Today over 4 
million households in England are classed as fuel poor, of which 3.2 million are 
classed as vulnerable. This is up from 1.2 million households in 2004. 
Finally, the economic and financial crisis is likely to have reduced the access to 
financial products linked to credit-scoring through unemployment and tightening of 
lending policies, though there are little statistics to prove this. 
4.3. Changes in financial exclusion in Leeds 
To see how far these national changes are mirrored locally, sample data from the 
Original and Repeat surveys were compared. In 2004, 410 households living in 
deprived neighbourhoods were surveyed (referred to as the Original survey). Six years 
later, in 2010, the same survey was conducted with 602 households in the same 
neighbourhoods (referred to as the Repeat survey). In addition, a survey was 
conducted with 300 in four areas with average levels of deprivation (referred to as the 
Extended survey). The latter sample had a higher proportion of working households 
and homeowners, and was conducted to assess the effect of the recent recession. 
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The survey results suggest that the households surveyed in 2010 had indeed been 
affected by the recession. One in four households across both samples had someone 
who had been made redundant, had their hours reduced or had their pay cut during the 
previous twelve months. There was also a significantly greater proportion of 
unemployed in the Repeat and Extended samples compared with the Original sample. 
This is likely to affect the extent and nature of financial exclusion of the Repeat 
sample, as households on low fixed incomes with weak or no links to the labour 
market are less likely to hold and use most mainstream financial products. 
A comparison of the survey data from 2004 and 2010 suggests that on many measures 
the nature and extent of financial exclusion in Leeds has largely followed that of the 
UK. The access to basic banking and transaction services has increased. There has 
been a significant increase in ownership of bank accounts as well as a significant fall 
in the percentage that have been denied a bank account since the Original survey. 
There is also evidence suggesting an increased usage of direct debits. 
The Repeat survey saw a significant drop in the propensity to save, the frequency of 
saving and level of savings. Since 2004 the proportion of households without savings 
has nearly doubled. There is also a significant fall in the likelihood of having home 
contents insurance.  
There was a fall in both mainstream and sub-prime borrowing. There has been a 
significant fall in the percentage of respondents using home credit and catalogue 
credit. There was also a significant rise in households having been rejected in their 
application for credit. This may suggest a tightening of lending policy and a 
worsening of people‟s credit scoring. In terms of affordable credit, there was an 
increase in awareness of the credit union though no significant change in credit union 
membership since the Original survey. However, the number of Leeds Credit Union 
adult members has increased from just over 10,000 in 2004 to over 21,500 in 2010. In 
the same period the total membership (including junior accounts and members under 
the age of 18) rose from 12,000 to in excess of 26,000. 
Similar to the national trends, over-indebtedness and fuel poverty in Leeds also appear 
to have risen since 2004. There has been a significant rise in the level of worry of 
getting into debt. In the Original survey, 40% were very or fairly worried compared 
with 60% in the Repeat survey. There is also a significant increase in the percentage 
of households who are behind with one or more bills, though the list of possible bills 
was more extensive in 2010 than in 2004. Finally, a significantly higher proportion of 
survey respondents were struggling to pay their fuel bills in the Original survey than 
in the Repeat. However, a higher proportion of respondents are now paying their fuel 
bills using direct debits, which tends to lead to lower fuel bills relative to prepayment 
meter and cash payments. 
4.4. Groups and areas most affected by financial exclusion 
A comparison of the Original and Repeat survey respondents suggest that the same 
groups are experiencing financial exclusion. In both the Original and Repeat survey, 
social housing tenants were far more likely to have fallen behind with bills than 
owner-occupiers. Owner occupiers were more likely to have savings and home 
contents insurance than other tenures. Overwhelmingly, workless and lone parent 
households were more likely to have no savings at all or less than £100. The groups 
least likely to have a bank account were men under 60 living alone and pensioner only 
households. 
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However, an examination of the respondents in the Extended sample suggests that 
financial exclusion also affects less deprived areas and groups other than lone parents 
and households on means-tested benefits. The respondents of the Extended sample, 
generally more affluent than the Original and Repeat survey samples, were only 
slightly more likely to save using a bank or building society account than the 
respondents of the Original survey. They were significantly less likely to save, in any 
form, compared with the Original survey. Also the respondents of the Extended 
survey were less likely to have mainstream borrowing compared with the Original 
survey respondents.  
4.5. Implications for research and policy 
The findings of this report paint a somewhat bleak picture of financial exclusion in 
Leeds. With the important exception of access to and use of banking and transaction 
services, financial exclusion has grown since the last survey. This is not necessarily a 
reflection on the significant financial inclusion interventions implemented in the UK 
and in Leeds. On the contrary, a recent study of the economic and regeneration impact 
of financial inclusion activities in Leeds estimated that these interventions had a 
cumulative impact on the regional economy of £28 million (Dayson et al, 2009). 
Ultimately, as with any, the impact of financial inclusion interventions can only be 
ascertained through a designated study examining the effects on beneficiaries of a 
given number of interventions and also the costs of these interventions. 
However, the findings of this study provide important lessons for financial inclusion 
practitioners. First, the influence of national factors on financial exclusion locally is 
likely to be considerable. In virtually all aspects of financial exclusion the survey data 
suggest that Leeds mirrored the country. Although Leeds has proven innovative and 
effective in its approach to financial exclusion, the influence of national policies and 
regulatory regime is evident in numerous aspects. The enhanced access to bank 
accounts in Leeds is at least in part due to the national government‟s push on paying 
benefits into bank accounts and pushing for the introduction of no-frills bank accounts. 
This would suggest that local authorities and other stakeholders in financial inclusion 
also need to be attuned to the national picture and lobby the national government for 
the implementation of more effective financial inclusion policies. 
Second, the trends in financial exclusion are closely linked to trends in employment 
and other socioeconomic factors. For example, access to mainstream loans is often 
dependant on the respondent being in employment. This suggests that combating 
financial exclusion is not likely to be effective if done in isolation of wider social 
inclusion interventions and labour market interventions. Financial inclusion 
interventions are important to avoid people slipping back into the cash economy as 
they are leaving the labour market. 
Finally, financial exclusion is not only affecting traditionally financially excluded 
groups and areas, but also less deprived areas and households. The respondents 
residing in less deprived areas were in fact less likely to save and have mainstream 
borrowing than respondents in the deprived areas surveyed in 2004. They were also 
slightly more likely to have had an application for credit rejected. This would suggest 
that financial inclusion interventions should not only target the typically financially 
excluded, but also less deprived areas and households.  
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A. Survey methodology 
Survey methodology and sampling 
A total of 902 people were interviewed face to face in their homes during February 2010. 
This included 602 respondents in the original eleven areas which included parts of the wards 
of Burmantofts and Richmond Hill, City and Hunslet, Gipton and Harehills, Hyde Park and 
Woodhouse, and Killingbeck and Seacroft, some of the most deprived parts of the City. A 
further 300 people were interviewed in four areas with median indices of deprivation. This 
latter sample attempted to concentrate on owner occupiers.  
Given the relatively small sample size and the fact that this survey concentrated on looking at 
the experiences of people at risk of financial exclusion, the deprived sample areas were 
selected from sub-areas within wards with the highest levels of benefit claimants. These were 
the same areas sampled in the Original survey in 2004. Current data on the number of benefit 
claimants suggests these areas have not changed greatly over the six year period. The final 
areas were selected so that a range of types of areas were covered. This included „garden city‟ 
type housing estates, inner city council areas and inner city areas with terraced housing. 
Eleven areas were selected as follows: 
- Holbeck: area south of City centre and north of M621 motorway.  This area is bounded 
by Ninevah Rd in the east and Domestic Road in the north; 
- Little London: area bounded by Clay Pit Lane in the south, Meanwood Road in the north 
east, Leicester Place/Blenheim Grove in the south west and Craven Place in the north; 
- Lincoln Green: area around Lincoln Green Road and area to east of Becketts Street but 
south of Shakespeare Street; 
- Harehills: area bounded by Harehills Lane in the east, Harehills Avenue in the north, 
Spencer Place in the west and Bayswater Road/Ashley Road in the south; 
- Gipton: area around St Wilfred‟s Grove; 
- South Farms Road: area around South Farms Road bounded in north by Caldecote Drive 
and in south by Gipton Approach; 
- Seacroft: area to south west of Parklands  
- Halton Moor: part of the state south of Neville Road 
- Richmond Hill: area just to the west of East End Park, south of York Road, north of 
railway line and bounded in the west by Pontefract Lane; 
- Beeston Hill: bounded in east by Dewsbury Road, in north by Hunslet Hall Road, to west 
by Tempest Road and to south by Trentham Street; 
- In addition, a small number of interviews were conducted in Belle Isle: area around Belle 
Isle Circus. 
Four new areas, middle level super output areas, were included in this study as follows: 
- Upper Armley, all the Middle level SOA.  This area is bounded by Stanningley Road to 
the north, a railway line to the south, Wortley Road and Armley Ridge to the east and the 
area of New Scarborough to the west; 
- Yeadon (Henshaws, Southway and Westfields) the area to the north and to the west of 
Yeadon Town Centre concentrating on „right to buy‟ former council properties; 
- Oakwood and Gipton Wood: the area bounded by Easterly Road, Roundhay Road, 
Oakwood Lane, Oakwood Grange Lane and North Grove Rise, which comprises lower 
level SOA‟s 037C,D and E; 
- Rothwell area and Middleton Heritage Village and Robin Hood:  Initially the intention 
was to conduct interviews in the Middleton Heritage Village, Robin Hood South, 
Lofthouse and Thorpe MSOA, concentrating on the new build owner occupier housing. It 
proved however very difficult to find lower income owner occupiers other than in a few 
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areas of „starter home‟ type flats which only have door entry phones where interviews are 
extremely difficult to achieve. Instead interviews were conducted in Rothwell which has a 
similar IMD. 
The sample was designed to be representative of the population within these areas using data 
from National Statistics. Interviewers were given quotas based on gender, age, ethnic origin 
and employment status.  
Statistical significance of results 
The sampling tolerance depends on both the number of interviews and on the proportion of 
people giving a particular response. 
Table A.1: Approximate sampling tolerance: percentage of respondents giving a response at or 
near these levels 
 10% or 90% 30% or 70% 50% 
All interviews original areas 
(602) 
+/- 2.5% +/- 4% +/-4% 
Individual new areas 
75 responses 
+/- 7.0% +/- 10% +/- 12% 
All new areas 
300 responses 
+/-  3.5% +/- 5% +/- 6% 
Comparing results from 2004 to 2009* 
410 and 602 interviews 4% 6% 6% 
Notes: * Percentage results need to differ by to be statistically different 
For the sample in the original areas (Sample A), this means that if 30% of the sample overall 
gave a particular response, the true answer lies between 26% and 34%, although it is more 
likely to be near 30%. When comparing the results for the Original and Repeat surveys, 
results will need to differ by about 6% to be considered statistically different. 
Weighting results 
The sample for the Repeat survey was based on quotas for age, gender, ethnic origin and 
employment status for the two surveys. The Rpeat survey is broadly similar to the Original 
survey apart from tenure, which is a key factor in the level of financial exclusion. The Repeat 
survey interviewed a slightly lower proportion of owner occupiers than were contacted in 
2004. The Repeat figures slightly under-represent the proportion of owner occupiers when 
compared to 2001 Census. To ensure the results can be compared the 2010 data for the 
Repeat survey is weighted to the tenure profile of the Original survey. The weighted results, 
presented here, do not differ by more than one percentage point from the unweighted results.  
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B. Overview of sample 
Table B.1 compares the samples for the Original and Repeat surveys by area. 
Table B.1: Main sample by area 
 Original sample Repeat sample 
Beeston Hill 60 85 
Burmantofts 40 60 
Gipton 25 36 
Halton Moor 35 52 
Harehills 65 96 
Holbeck 50 75 
Little London 35 50 
Belle Isle 10 15 
Richmond Hill 30 44 
Seacroft 30 45 
South Farm 30 44 
Total sample 410 602 
Given the relatively small sample size and the fact that this survey concentrated on looking at 
the experiences of people at risk of financial exclusion, the deprived sample areas were 
selected from sub-areas within these wards with the highest levels of benefit claimants.  
In addition to conducting a survey of these areas, the Extended survey also covered four areas 
with average levels of deprivation, in part to assess the effect of the recent recession. Table 
B.2 displays this sample by area. 
Table B.2: Extended sample by area 
Upper Armley 75 
Rothwell, Robin Hood 75 
Yeadon 75 
Gipton Wood 75 
Number respondents 300 
A further 300 people were interviewed in four areas with median indices of deprivation. 
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Table B.3 displays some basic demographic data for the sample. 
Table B.3: Sample demographics (%) 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
Female 52 53 52 
Age group    
18-29 years 32 31 26 
30-44 years 32 35 31 
45-59 years 18 18 23 
60 years < 18 16 21 
With children    
None 54 53 53 
> 5 years 22 25 17 
5-10 years 22 24 21 
11-16 years 22 17 23 
17-18 years 4 5 8 
Disability    
Physical self* 22 20 13 
Physical other in HH* 15 10 10 
Mental health self … 5 3 
Mental health other in HH … 2 2 
Car ownership 32 35 70 
Number respondents 410 594 300 
Notes: HH = Household, * The Original survey does not distinguish between mental and physical 
disability 
The data in the table suggests that the Original and the Repeat samples are similar and 
broadly comparable in terms of demographics. There is a similar proportion of women, age 
groups and in terms of households with children.  
The Extended sample differs from the Repeat sample in that it has a larger proportion of car 
owners, reflecting that it is a more affluent group, and it also has a smaller proportion of 
disabled people. 
Table B.4 shows the employment status for the sample. 
Table B.4: Employment status (%) 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
No-one in HH working 52 55 38 
Full-time employment 21 18 30 
Part-time employment 11 11 12 
Self-employed 1 3 4 
Full-time education 3 2 2 
Unemployed 12 22 18 
Home maker 22 20 10 
Retired 17 14 18 
Long-term ill 12 10 7 
Other 1 - 1 
Number respondents 410 594 300 
Notes: HH = Household 
The Original and Repeat samples are largely comparable in terms of employment status. A 
similar proportion of respondents were in full or part-time employment or homemakers. Also, 
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the percentage of respondents from households with no-one in employment was similar for 
the Original and Repeat surveys, though slightly higher in the latter. It is noteworthy that a 
significantly larger proportion of the respondents of the Repeat survey were unemployed 
compared with the Original survey. This reflects the rising unemployment in Leeds and 
nationally over the past few years. It must also be noted that, combined, a significantly larger 
proportion of respondents of the Original survey were homemakers, retired or long-term ill 
relative to the Repeat survey which may help explain the higher proportion of unemployed in 
the Repeat survey. 
Excluding pensioner households, 48% of households in the Repeat survey were workless. 
This is far higher than the national average where 16% of all households are workless as are 
42% of lone parents and 6% of couples with dependent children (Labour Force Survey, 2008). 
The proportion of workless households in the Extended sample was lower at 38%, although 
the proportion of workless households in social housing was similar.  Excluding pensioner 
households, 20% of households were workless, only marginally above the national average 
(Labour Force Survey for 2008). 
Table B.5 shows housing tenure by sample. 
Table B.5: Housing tenure (%) 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
Housing tenure    
Council tenant 52 53 9 
HA tenant 4 4 3 
Private landlord tenant 17 18 20 
Own with mortgage 18 18 38 
Own outright 8 8 30 
Time in area    
> 1 year 12 7 9 
1-2 years 10 11 7 
2-5 years 12 15 11 
5-10 years 11 16 19 
11-20 years 18 18 15 
20 years < 37 32 40 
N 410 594 300 
Notes: HA = Housing Association 
In terms of housing tenure, the Original and Repeat samples are nearly identical. In both 
samples nearly 60% are social housing tenants, 75% are tenants and around 25% are 
homeowners. There are a significantly higher proportion of respondents that have lived in the 
area for less than one year in the Original survey relative to the Repeat survey. Otherwise 
there are no significant differences between the samples. 
Conversely, the vast majority of the respondents of the Extended sample are, by design, 
homeowners (nearly 70%). Only 12% are social housing tenants, while around 20% are 
private tenants. 
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Table B.6 displays the ethnic origin of the sample. 
Table B.6: Ethnic origin (%) 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
White British 75 68 82 
Irish - 1 0 
Other White - 2 2 
Mixed White & Black Caribbean 1 1 0 
Mixed White & Black African 0 - 0 
Mixed White & Asian - - 1 
Mixed Other 0 - - 
Indian 1 1 2 
Pakistani 8 11 7 
Bangladeshi 4 5 1 
Other Asian 1 1 0 
Black African 4 5 1 
Caribbean 1 2 3 
Any other Black 1 2 - 
Chinese - - 0 
Other 3 1 1 
Number respondents 410 594 300 
Notes: - fewer than 0.5% gave that response 
There are few significant differences between the samples in terms of ethnicity. The 
proportion of White British is significantly lower in the Repeat survey. However, the 
proportion of White respondents is not significantly different. There is a higher, though not 
significantly so, proportion of respondents of Pakistani origin in the Repeat survey. The 
Extended sample has a larger proportion of respondents classifying themselves as White. 
Table B.7 shows the proportion of clients and non-clients receiving benefits, which is a key 
indicator of poverty. 
Table B.7: Benefits (%)* 
 Original 
sample 
Repeat 
sample 
Extended sample 
Benefits 74 78 58 
Eligible for free school meal 19 15 11 
Housing benefits 45 50 20 
Council tax benefit 46 51 27 
Job seeker allowance 8 20 11 
Income support 31 18 12 
Incapacity/disability benefit 18 16 13 
Child tax credit … 29 27 
Pensioner credit … 10 6 
Working tax credit 11 15 11 
Disability tax credit 1 … … 
Other benefit 2 1 1 
Don‟t know / refused 7 1 0 
Number respondents 410 592 300 
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The receipt of benefits is similar to that found in the Original survey but direct comparisons 
cannot be made as the benefit regime has changed since 2004 with the introduction of Child 
Tax Credit and changes to Working Tax Credit. 
Overall there is no statistically significant difference between the Original and Repeat 
samples in terms of receiving benefits. There are significant differences in terms of receiving 
some specific benefits. A significantly higher proportion of Repeat survey respondents are on 
JSA, which largely corresponds to the percentage of respondents who state that they are 
unemployed. A significantly larger percentage of the Original sample were in receipt of 
income support relative to the Repeat sample. In the Repeat survey, 46% of the respondents 
with children aged between 5 and 16 years were eligible for free school meals, compared 
with 54% of respondents in the Original survey. In the Extended sample, the same figure was 
36%. The respondents of the Original survey were also significantly more likely to not 
disclose the benefits they were receiving. 
Table B.8 shows the income group of the respondents. 
Table B.8: Weekly income (%)* 
 Original sample Repeat sample Extended sample 
> £60 8 7 2 
£60-119 27 27 10 
£120-199 33 30 15 
£200-299 14 18 20 
£300-479 13 12 20 
£480-674 5 4 15 
£675 <*  2 18 
N 292 343 186 
* In the Original survey the highest income group was £480 < 
The incomes for both the Original and Repeat survey are far below the national average. The 
2007/2008 Family Resources Survey (FRS) indicates that nationally 22% of households have 
a weekly income of less than £200 per week and 44% have a weekly income of more than 
£500 per week. In comparison, of those who gave a figure in the Repeat survey, only 5% of 
respondents said they had a household income greater than £480 per week (equivalent to 
£25,000). Only 17% had an income above £300 per week (£15,000 per year). A total of 65% 
of those giving a figure had an income of below £200 per week and a third (34%) had an 
income of below £120 per week. 
The FRS (then the Family Expenditure Survey) for 1999/2000 gives an average gross income 
of £482 per week and an average disposable income of £392 per week. It is not possible to 
calculate an average income for this survey as respondents were asked to put their income 
into ranges but it is clear from Table B.8 that almost all respondents had a weekly income 
below the national average. 
Income levels in the Extended sample were higher with 18% of those giving a figure having a 
household income of more than £675 per week and 27% an income below £200 per week. 
 
 
 
 
